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Mostrar mensagens com a etiqueta europa-economia-países. Mostrar todas as mensagens

30 de maio de 2016

Ideologia neoliberal e a ideologia anti-neoliberal

Não gosto que no meio de um argumento, onde eu seja uma das partes, surja o recurso ao "neoliberalismo" - como sou economista, isso assume, objetivamente, o caráter de um epíteto, de um insulto, de castigo por aquilo que eu penso de menos alinhado em relação à conventional wisdom da esquerda alinhada com a geringonça - é assim que me sinto; não dou parte do sentimento, mas ele aí está, como está a irritação com o que isso revela de estreiteza de visão e de falta de conhecimento. E estreiteza de visão e falta de conhecimento estão associadas a tomadas de posição ideológicas primárias. E na verdade, acontece, se existe uma ideologia neoliberal, existe, igualmente, uma ideologia anti-neoliberal. 

Um exemplo ilustra bem as duas linhas - o da denominada austeridade. Um economista inglês, de esquerda, anti-austeritário, há muito pouco tempo, lembrava que austeridade não é um programa de política económica, mas a consequência de uma política económica, corretamente, denominada de consolidação orçamental - essa política, em dados momentos e em dadas circunstâncias, tem de ser aplicada, embora com o resultado desagradável da austeridade. O que faz deste economista, de esquerda, um anti-austeritário, é que ele considera que a conjuntura económica mundial exigiria, neste momento, um programa de política económico, que vamos designar, para simplificar, de keynesiano, de estímulo orçamental, e que o esforço de consolidação orçamental, só deveria ocorrer, muito depois, noutra conjuntura, com a economia mundial a singrar, normalmente, fora do buraco. Na sua leitura (e de muitos economistas, incluindo, este vosso criado), os EUA, o Reino Unido, a Alemanha, etc., seguiram, e seguem, políticas de consolidação orçamental, a destempo e inapropriadas (no caso dos EUA, de modo mais específico, e menos direto). A razão para que isso tenha vindo a suceder, desdobra-se num conjunto alargado de causas, mas a ideologia neoliberal (e a sua variante alemão, o ordoliberalismo) fornece grande parte do acicate, da defesa teórica e da validação da linha seguida.

No entretanto, o mesmo economista, de esquerda, anti-austeritário (e todos os outros, incluindo, este vosso criado) excetua da sua reprovação da política económica seguida, generalizadamente, os países da periferia sul da Europa que terão de continuar o seu programa de consolidação orçamental pelo facto de pertencerem a uma união monetária, e só por essa via serem capazes de readquirem competitividade. É óbvio que esse esforço, com consequências austeritárias, seria atenuado se os países que o podem fazer, nomeadamente, a Alemanha, fizessem a tal política a contrário, uma política expansionista. Aqui haveria, numa análise mais fina, haveria lugar a muitas qualificações (por exemplo, eu não duvido que uma política de consolidação orçamental teria sido necessária, face à situação a que se chegou, mesmo que não estivéssemos na UEM - isto é a política de desvalorização nominal podendo dar uma ajuda, nunca seria só por si suficiente). Negar esta necessidade, é um exemplo da ideologia económica dominante em Portugal, nesta conjuntura política, a ideologia anti-neoliberal, que é restringida nos seus potenciais efeitos desastrosos pelos compromissos europeus.

O que se segue, é o exemplo da prevalência dessa ideologia, na ausência de quaisquer entraves: é o caso da Venezuela, mas poderiam ser chamados à colação muitos outros exemplos

Declaração de interesse: ... e para que não haja dúvidas, porque sou um economista assim-assim, sabendo com alguma precisão o muito que não sei sobre a área de conhecimento em causa , não sou, ideologicamente, nem neoliberal nem anti-neoliberal - não que não esteja em curso um projeto para saber os contornos e a designação da minha ideologia: o trabalho começou há muitas décadas, e não promete estar concluído nas próximas quarto décadas (desconfio que seria necessário mais tempo).

21 de março de 2012

Indústrialização e globalização - algumas leituras

Fui colecionando, a este propósito, alguns artigos. São todos muito interessantes, e carreando muito material para reflexão: o bold é meu .


It is hard to estimate how much more it would cost to build iPhones in the United States. However, various academics and manufacturing analysts estimate that because labor is such a small part of technology manufacturing, paying American wages would add up to $65 to each iPhone’s expense. Since Apple’s profits are often hundreds of dollars per phone, building domestically, in theory, would still give the company a healthy reward. 

But such calculations are, in many respects, meaningless because building the iPhone in the United States would demand much more than hiring Americans — it would require transforming the national and global economies. Apple executives believe there simply aren’t enough American workers with the skills the company needs or factories with sufficient speed and flexibility. Other companies that work with Apple, like Corning, also say they must go abroad. [....]

Wages weren’t the major reason for the disparities. Rather it was costs like inventory and how long it took workers to finish a task. [....]


In the past decade, the flow of goods emerging from U.S. factories has risen by about a third. Factory employment has fallen by roughly the same fraction. The story of Standard Motor Products, a 92-year-old, family-run manufacturer based in Queens, sheds light on both phenomena. It’s a story of hustle, ingenuity, competitive success, and promise for America’s economy. It also illuminates why the jobs crisis will be so difficult to solve.


Politicians say we have the most productive workers in the world. They don't know what they're talking about. 

Alternatively, companies can cut costs by seeking out cheaper suppliers around the world—to use the business school term, they can engage in global supply chain management. A U.S.-based computer company can lower its costs by moving its customer call center from South Dakota to India. Walmart can shift its clothing purchases from a Chinese shirt manufacturer to a cheaper supplier in Vietnam. Apple can find a cheaper offshore supplier for its iPhone display screen. 

But here’s the rub: both of these corporate strategies— domestic productivity improvements and global supply chain management—show up as productivity gains in U.S. economic records. When federal statisticians calculate the nation’s economic output, what they are actually measuring is domestic “value added”—the dollar value of all sales minus the dollar value of all imports. “Productivity” is then calculated by dividing the quantity of value added by the number of American workers. American workers, however, often have little to do with the gains in productivity attributed to them. For instance, if Company A saves $250,000 simply by switching from a Japanese sprocket supplier to a much cheaper Chinese sprocket supplier, that change shows up as an increase in American productivity—just as if the company had saved $250,000 by making its warehouse operation in Chicago more efficient.[....]



[....] David Ignatius is one of the people who works in this industry. His Post column today urges readers to contemplate the awful thought that, quoting Francis Fukuyama:"What if the further development of technology and globalization undermines the middle class and makes it impossible for more than a minority of citizens in an advanced society to achieve middle-class status?”It is very useful to the One Percent to pretend that their wealth and the near stagnation in living standards for everyone else is just the result of "the further development of technology and globalization." However this has nothing to do with reality. Globalization has hurt the living standards of the middle class... In the same vein it is not technology by itself that has made some people very rich. It is largely government granted patent and copyright monopolies that have made people rich. These polices are becoming increasingly inefficient mechanisms for supporting innovation and creative work. [....]


In the past 30 years, the UK's manufacturing sector has shrunk by two-thirds, the greatest de-industrialisation of any major nation. It was done in the name of economic modernisation – but what has replaced it? [....]

19 de fevereiro de 2012

Retirado, sem comentário, de uma nota sobre a situação actual da economia checa ...

Quick Reality Czech | A Fistful Of Euros: [....] Others explain the phenomenon culturally – the Czech’s are a nation of savers, unlike the Estonians whose reckless spending lead them into a housing boom/bust (do note the irony, please).

Sylvie Pekarova, a 33-year-old pharmaceutical researcher in Prague, has no debt. She doesn’t even own a credit card.

Consumers like Pekarova have helped the Czech Republic avoid the fate of the euro region, which is grappling with a debt crisis now into its third year. With private borrowing at half the euro region’s average, the country now boasts interest rates that are lower than 10 of the currency-bloc’s 17 members. That’s helping the government’s drive to sell benchmark Eurobonds, which started this week.

“It’s this feeling that if something goes wrong, you don’t want to be stuck with debts you don’t know how to pay back,” Pekarova, who lives in a rented apartment in central Prague, said in an interview. “Borrowing money for things like going on a holiday doesn’t make sense.”
[....]

1 de janeiro de 2012

Previsões - as mais convincentes que li até ao momento


In a normal year predicting economics is like predicting the outcome of a card game: there are too many variables and the only certainty being that the suckers will lose and the stealthily self-interested will win. In 2012 however, the shape of the crisis is heavily predetermined: there are a series of crucial stages the eurocrisis has to go through and the way they're resolved will affect everything else. Starting from where we are now, there are three big questions:
  • Is the ECB's unofficial money printing operation - a massively expanded bond-buying venture combined with unlimited provision of cash by global central banks - going to be enough to prevent a second credit crunch, centred on Italy?
  • Does Greece spiral finally into default, social crisis and chaos, raising the prospect of the near-dictatorial economic policies needed if you have to exit the Euro?
  • Do the French banks take so many losses on the sovereign debt of southern Europe that they have to be part nationalised, thus removing the country's AAA credit rating and the all-important financial parity between Germany and France that lies at the heart of the European system?
Right now my answers to these questions would be yes, yes and yes. [e continua ...]

23 de dezembro de 2011

Quando em desespero com os políticos, os economistas falam de regras ... à falta de melhor solução ...


Costas Meghir argues that an important element of the Greek malaise is the credibility of Greek politicians and their long history of abusing their power by borrowing vast amounts and spending them to satisfy specific interests and a client-based political system. Their behavior is not a surprise to the student of political economy: politicians, like everyone else, act in their best interest. Constitutions and laws are there to align their interests as far as possible with those of the people they serve. Given the existential crisis of the Greek economy it is now an opportunity to reform the constitution to improve the credibility and incentives of the politicians. Meghir proposes a constitutionally mandated cap on the deficit of 3% and on the debt to gdp ratio of 60%, following a suitable period of adjustment and the necessary restructuring of the debt. He also proposes the abolition of all immunity from prosecution of all government ministers and all members of parliament.

15 de dezembro de 2011

Até aonde se pode ir em termos de dívida externa...


The middle column indicates the room between a country's current debt-to-GDP ratio and the maximum sustainable ratio, according to this analyis. And the right column indicates the maximum yield which, if sustained, will not result in a spiral of collapse (in which rising interest costs make debt less affordable, contributing to rising interest costs). One can quibble with the results; I'm sure there are many people who think markets would abandon America long before its debt-to-GDP ratio topped 200%. But the yield calculations are very interesting.

Greece, Portugal, Italy, and Ireland already sport 10-year yields above the make-or-break level. Now, these yields don't bring everything crashing down right away. They have to be sustained, so as to have an impact on actual debt costs as countries are forced to roll over existing debt as it comes due. Spanish yields have been above the critical threshold at times but have since fallen back below it.

12 de dezembro de 2011

A guerra de classes e a situação da Eurozona

Excelente explicação por um economista alemão do porquê da criação do euro (não refere, no entanto, todas as razões) e de toda a situação em que a Europa está metida.


11 de dezembro de 2011

Leituras sobre a Europa (pós-cimeira)

 A bold aquilo que considero mais interessante. 

    Algumas das leituras sobre a Europa (antes cimeira)

    Da mais antiga para a mais recente (antes da cimeira). Aquelas que considero mais interessantes (quaisquer que sejam os motivos) sublinhei-as com o bold.

    29 de novembro de 2011

    Se isto corre mal, irá correr mal para todos ...

    ... e o que se vê no gráfico, ainda que sugestivo, não será o canal de transmissão mais importante.


    PS: 
    E no mesmo sentido vem o que se diz em The euro crisis: Trouble around the other periphery | The Economist: onde se faz referência, a iniciar a peça, a um "striking statement made by Poland's foreign minister, Radek Sikorski, in a speech given yesterday:
    I will probably be the first Polish foreign minister in history to say so, but here it is: I fear German power less than I am beginning to fear German inactivity.

    Desemprego na Europa