A diferença é que uns ainda fazem estudos, mesmo que não tenham planos de contingência; outros, nem sabem que pode haver um problema cuja "remota", mas séria possibilidade, exigiria estudo...

Peak oil: 'Nothing to worry about' – but Labour knew the real facts | George Monbiot | Environment | guardian.co.uk: 

"In public, the last government shrugged off the prospect of peak oil. In private, we know now that it had a different view. A powerpoint presentation released at last by the Department of Energy and Climate Change, in response to freedom of information (FoI) requests by the indefatigable Lionel Badal, shows that in 2007 the Labour government spent six months secretly gaming the likely impacts of declining global oil supplies. The results were not pretty.

The officials who conducted the assessment found that 'it is not possible to predict with any accuracy exactly when or why oil production will peak'. They believed that 'a permanent decline in global oil production [ie, peak oil] is unlikely to take place before 2020. However, if it were to happen, the consequences for economic prosperity and security are likely to be serious'. Among these consequences were:

• Impacts on UK security of oil supply

• Disruption of the UK economy especially the transport sector

• Possible geopolitical implications.

If peak oil hit the UK economy, the officials found, it could take 'several years or even decades' for the government and the economy to adjust."

Obviamente, para continuar a ler... 

Convém não esquecer ....

Abaixo o sumário do que o FMI diz sobre as tendências da evolução do mercado do petróleo ( ver em trends in the market for oil) e potenciais consequências sobre o crescimento mundial:

Energy prices: Oil and trouble | The Economist: The persistent increase in oil prices over the past decade suggests that global oil markets have entered a period of increased scarcity. Given the expected rapid growth in oil demand in emerging market economies and a downshift in the trend growth of oil supply, a return to abundance is unlikely in the near term. This chapter suggests that gradual and moderate increases in oil scarcity may not present a major constraint on global growth in the medium to long term, although the wealth transfer from oil importers to exporters would increase capital flows and widen current account imbalances. Adverse effects could be much larger, depending on the extent and evolution of oil scarcity and the ability of the world economy to cope with increased scarcity. Sudden surges in oil prices could trigger large global output losses, redistribution, and sectoral shifts. There are two broad areas for policy action. First, given the potential for unexpected increases in the scarcity of oil and other resources, policymakers should review whether the current policy frameworks facilitate adjustment to unexpected changes in oil scarcity. Second, consideration should be given to policies aimed at lowering the risk of oil scarcity.

Obviamente, isto deve ser uma preocupação maior da governação dos Açores.