19 de janeiro de 2010

A situação económica dos outros

O que se apresenta abaixo são referências de comentários e análises sobre as outras situações, aparentadas à nossa, na periferia sul e oeste da Zona Euro, lidas nos últimos dois meses. Todas acabam por carrear informação e análise que cruzam com a análise do que se passa, a nível económico e financeiro, em Portugal.
  • Government sacrificing reform on altar of pay cuts - The Irish Times - Tue, Dec 08, 2009: "The savings would have come primarily through staff reductions, which will be the inevitable, permanent and calculable result of the Government’s ongoing recruitment embargo and other policies like the rationalisation of State agencies. The vision that we offered the Government was one where, in exchange for guarantees over pay, pensions and compulsory redundancies, staff would deliver the massive changes in work practices required to ensure that these falling staff numbers would not damage services. The proposed deal included explicit agreement on the redeployment of civil and public servants, within and between organisations, to ensure better services as budgets and staffing declined." (via The Irish Economy » Blog Archive » Public Sector Reform)
  • So What’s It All About, Costas? | afoe | A Fistful of Euros | European Opinion: "As Titus Maccius Plautus reputedly put it, I am a rich man for just as long as I don’t have to pay back my debts, and of debts in Greece there were plenty, especially in the public sector. So the growth we saw in the first eight years of this century was hardly normal, since it was based on a model of growing indebtedness which was always going to fail one day or another. One consequence of this is that no one really knows what “trend” growth in Greece would look like at this point (the same goes for those other two Eurozone “star performers” Spain and Ireland) since we don’t really know how much of recent growth was valid, and how much was due to overheating, and we won’t really start to get a clear picture till we see what the downside is, and how far it runs."
  • FT.com / Columnists / Wolfgang Munchau - Greece can expect no gifts from Europe: "[...] The EU’s authorities, rightly or wrongly, are more afraid of the moral hazard of a bail-out than the possible spillover effect of a hypothetical Greek default to other eurozone countries. If faced with a choice between preserving the integrity of the stability pact and the integrity of Greece, they are currently minded to choose the former. To safeguard what is left of the stability pact, they are determined to link any help to a country’s willingness to comply. Otherwise the EU fears it might lose all leverage over budgetary processes elsewhere in the eurozone.. So instead of helping Greece, the EU might be asking Greece to pay a penalty. [...] The current strategy of the EU is to raise the political pressure – perhaps even provoke a political crisis – with the strategic objective that the Greek government might eventually relent. It is a dangerous strategy that could easily backfire. Even if George Papandreou, the Greek prime minister, were sympathetic to the EU’s demand, he would face enormous political headwinds if he tried to implement draconian austerity measures. [...] The real problem is that the Greek people have not been prepared by their political leaders for what lies ahead. [...]In the absence of help from the eurozone, the Greek government would have to resort to the International Monetary Fund if it were to encounter difficulties refinancing the debt. Unlike Argentina, Greece cannot devalue, and leaving the eurozone is not a realistic policy option either. Latvian-style austerity could thus come one way or the other, with or without default. [...]".
  • Roubini Global Economics - RGE Monitor -- Europe EconoMonitor: Quantifying Eurozone Imbalances and the Internal Devaluation of Greece and Spain "Essentially, what Greece and Spain now face (alongside Ireland, Hungary, Latvia etc) is an internal devaluation which has to serve as the only means of adjustment since, as is evidently clearly, the nominal exchange rate is bound by the gravitional laws of the Eurozone. Now, I am not making an argument about the virtues of devaluation versus a domestic structural correction since it will often be a combination of the two (i.e. as in Hungary). What I am trying to emphasize is simply two things; firstly, the danger of imposing internal devaluations in economies whose demographic structure resemble that of Greece and Spain and secondly, whether it can actually be done within the confines of the current political and economic setup in the Eurozone."
  • FT.com / Columnists / Martin Wolf - The eurozone’s next decade will be tough: "What would have happened during the financial crisis if the euro had not existed? The short answer is that there would have been currency crises among its members. The currencies of Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain would surely have fallen sharply against the old D-Mark. That is the outcome the creators of the eurozone wished to avoid. They have been successful. But, if the exchange rate cannot adjust, something else must instead. That “something else” is the economies of peripheral eurozone member countries. They are locked into competitive disinflation against Germany, the world’s foremost exporter of very high-quality manufactures. I wish them luck."
  • FT.com / Brussels / Economy - EU to plan 10 years of growth: "Equally, it remains open whether the EU should set targets in its 2020 strategy, as some experts advise. “Targets are important policy levers, even if they are not met. They allow countries to compare themselves with others, and provide crucial goals and milestones that policymakers can use to raise awareness,” said Ann Mettler, executive director of the Lisbon Council think-tank."
  • FT.com / Comment / Opinion - Iceland would benefit from paying up: "Dear Icelandic friends, It is painful to observe your agony. A proud and independent nation is forced to vote in a referendum whether to pay billions of euros to the governments of the UK and the Netherlands. If you say No, your country will be seen as an unreliable partner. If you vote for the reimbursement, you will condemn your children to pay for the sins of their fathers. The national debt will balloon to roughly 200 per cent of gross domestic product – one of the highest levels in the world." Este é um finlandês a contar a experiência do seu país de como ser um pagador cumpridor tem consequências positivas no longo prazo.

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