Mostrar mensagens com a etiqueta desigualdade. Mostrar todas as mensagens
Mostrar mensagens com a etiqueta desigualdade. Mostrar todas as mensagens

19 de maio de 2016

Um vídeo, absolutamente, a ver...

A nota abaixo é complementada por um vídeo onde Branko Milanovic apresenta o seu novo livro Global Inequality: A New Approach for the Age of Globalization. Há quem coloque este livro na divisão do livro Capital no Século XXI de Piketty. Sugiro que vejam o vídeo primeiro; é o mais importante e a leitura da nota, depois do vídeo, será mais clara. Foi das coisas mais interessantes que vi nos últimos tempos. Para quem se interessa pela discussão das consequências da globalização, pelo fenómeno do crescimento da desigualdade e pelas eleições norte-americanas, é um labor incontornável.

Understanding Society: Global inequality

3 de março de 2016

Mayor Bill de Blasio e Paul Krugman falam de desigualdade, de programas de combate ao problema em NYC, de Bernie versus Hillary, e da continuação do combate ao racismo

Mayor Bill de Blasio e Paul Krugman falam sobre desigualdade em NYC e nos EUA. Bill de Blasio é um político impressivo e Krugman é Krugman. Os dois apoiam Hillary Cliton, mas não quem moderou a conversa. A partir dos 46 minutos a conversa incidiu sobre Bernie versus Hillary. Todo o vídeo merece ser visto.

29 de fevereiro de 2016

Desigualdade versus um crescimento económico insatisfatório, insuficiente, para os pobres e classe média

Leitura fortemente recomendada.

"The question of whether high inequality today bodes well for future rates of income growth and poverty reduction has recently acquired added relevance because of the slowdown of growth in rich countries and simultaneously rising inequality. The relationship between inequality and future growth has been extensively researched but, unfortunately, the results have proved to be inconclusive. We argue that by looking at the growth of average incomes (or GDP per capita) important heterogeneities are being overlooked. The question we should be asking is: how do individuals at different rungs of the socio-economic ladder fare in societies with different levels of inequality? This is precisely what two of us have done in a recent study."

Inequality harms economic growth for the poor

24 de fevereiro de 2016

Números interessantes

Um excerto, mas convém ler o artigo na totalidade. O artigo é de

" To understand why the problem confounds policymakers, it is helpful to compare the world’s two largest economies. The United States is a liberal democracy with a market-based economy, in which the factors of production are privately owned. China, by contrast, is governed by a political class that holds democracy in contempt. Its economy – despite decades of pro-market reforms – continues to be defined by heavy state intervention.

But despite their radically different political and economic systems, the two countries have roughly the same level of income inequality. Each country’s Gini coefficient – the most commonly used measure of income equality – is roughly 0.47.

In one important way, however, their situations are very different. In the US, inequality is rapidly worsening. In 1978, the top 1% of the US population was ten times richer than the rest of the country. Today, the average income of the top 1% is roughly 30 times that of the average person in the remaining 99%. During the same period, inequality in China has been declining."

The Inequality Puzzle

23 de fevereiro de 2016

Desigualdade versus Liberdade

É um ponto de vista interessante:

"Inequality doesn’t just reduce freedom for workers. It reduces freedom for business owners too.Will says this is because countries that want to tax and redistribute must have a healthy economy, which requires business freedom. I suspect that there are two other mechanisms at work.


One is that many of the rich have no interest in economic freedom. They want to protect extractive institutions and the monopoly power of incumbents from competition. They thus favour red tape, which tends to bear heavier upon small firms than big ones. This, I suspect, explains why inequality and unfreedom go together in Latin America, for example.


Secondly, people have a strong urge for fairness. If they cannot achieve this through market forces, they’ll demand it via the ballot box in the form of state regulation. As Philippe Aghion and colleagues point out, there is a negative correlation between union density and minimum wages: minimum wage laws are more likely to be found where unions are weak. Regulations, in this sense, are a substitute for strong unions – and, I suspect, a bad substitute because they are more inflexible."

7 de novembro de 2011

A tese é inabitual, mas o seu contributo explicativo para o sarilho em que estamos mergulhados, não é despiciendo.

A leitura de todo o artigo é obrigatória. O curioso é ter visto, ontem ou anteontem, na TV (em que canal não me recordo), um documentário sobre psicopatia que cruza com aquilo que aqui é dito. Abaixo, alguns trechos mais sumarentos:

The 1% are the very best destroyers of wealth the world has ever seen | George Monbiot | Comment is free | The Guardian

If wealth was the inevitable result of hard work and enterprise, every woman in Africa would be a millionaire. The claims that the ultra-rich 1% make for themselves – that they are possessed of unique intelligence or creativity or drive – are examples of the self-attribution fallacy. This means crediting yourself with outcomes for which you weren't responsible. [....]
The findings of the psychologist Daniel Kahneman, winner of a Nobel economics prize, are devastating to the beliefs that financial high-fliers entertain about themselves. He discovered that their apparent success is a cognitive illusion. [....]
[....] "The illusion of skill … is deeply ingrained in their culture." [....]
In a study published by the journal Psychology, Crime and Law, Belinda Board and Katarina Fritzon tested 39 senior managers and chief executives from leading British businesses. They compared the results to the same tests on patients at Broadmoor special hospital, where people who have been convicted of serious crimes are incarcerated. On certain indicators of psychopathy, the bosses's scores either matched or exceeded those of the patients. In fact, on these criteria, they beat even the subset of patients who had been diagnosed with psychopathic personality disorders. [....]

26 de outubro de 2011

De como a desigualdade prejudica as sociedades (nomeadamente, a nossa)| Video on TED.com




We feel instinctively that societies with huge income gaps are somehow going wrong. Richard Wilkinson charts the hard data on economic inequality, and shows what gets worse when rich and poor are too far apart: real effects on health, lifespan, even such basic values as trust.

Um dos factores que devem ser tidos em linha de conta para perceber o que se passa tem a ver com as consequências, não só sociais, mas também económicas e psicológicas, da desigualdade. O que se diz nesta intervenção a esse propósito é exemplar. A demonstração gráfica é-o igualmente. Ter em atenção o posicionamento de Portugal. Uma dica (no caso de não se lembrarem): a melhor forma de inspecionar os gráficos é suspender a passagem do vídeo.

25 de setembro de 2011

A verdadeira guerra de classes nos EUA

Conviria lerem todo o artigo.


Republicans and conservatives have done us a service by describing federal policies in terms of "class war." But by applying the term only to Obama's latest proposals to raise taxes on the rich, they have it all backward and upside down. The last 50 years have indeed seen continuous class warfare in and over federal economic policies.

15 de agosto de 2011

Um capitalista, Warren E. Buffett, explica a disfuncionalidade do tratamento fiscal dado aos mais ricos da sua classe, no seu país. A dúvida é quantos destes estariam de acordo com esta análise ou, o que diriam disto aqueles portugueses que mudaram a sede fiscal das suas empresas para a Holanda. Bem destes últimos não tenho dúvidas quanto à sua linha de defesa: ah, a invocação da disfuncionalidade do país.


OUR leaders have asked for “shared sacrifice.” But when they did the asking, they spared me. I checked with my mega-rich friends to learn what pain they were expecting. They, too, were left untouched.While the poor and middle class fight for us in Afghanistan, and while most Americans struggle to make ends meet, we mega-rich continue to get our extraordinary tax breaks. Some of us are investment managers who earn billions from our daily labors but are allowed to classify our income as “carried interest,” thereby getting a bargain 15 percent tax rate. Others own stock index futures for 10 minutes and have 60 percent of their gain taxed at 15 percent, as if they’d been long-term investors. 

These and other blessings are showered upon us by legislators in Washington who feel compelled to protect us, much as if we were spotted owls or some other endangered species. It’s nice to have friends in high places.Last year my federal tax bill — the income tax I paid, as well as payroll taxes paid by me and on my behalf — was $6,938,744. That sounds like a lot of money. But what I paid was only 17.4 percent of my taxable income — and that’s actually a lower percentage than was paid by any of the other 20 people in our office. Their tax burdens ranged from 33 percent to 41 percent and averaged 36 percent.

11 de agosto de 2011

Sobre o que se tem vindo a passar em Inglaterra

Obviamente, a questão de saber as causas do que se tem passado em Inglaterra é difícil porque é complexa. É fácil enumerar causas, e com um bocado de bom senso e de conhecimento, consegue-se listar um conjunto de factores que estarão, com toda a certeza, na base do fenómeno (desintegração social, ineficácia educativa e policial, banditismo, políticas, etc.). O que é difícil é imputar pesos à influência de cada um deles, e ao modo como se interligaram dinamicamente uns com os outros, logo caracterizar, de modo adequado, o "mix" que originou isto (e que já tinha sucedido em França, e há-de suceder em outros lados). Daí que toda a discussão, mesmo admitindo que seja informada e extensiva, só terá resultados aproximados na perceção da especificidade do problema.

Ter informação sobre o contexto mais amplo em que isto se insere poderá, no entanto, ajudar de modo significativo. Daquilo que li mais recentemente nada melhor do que o III Capítulo, A Insustentável Leveza da Política, do livro de Tony Judt, Um Tratado Sobre os Nossos Actuais Descontentamentos, Edições 70, para dar essa profundidade de campo - leitura fortemente recomendada. Eu questiono-me se os bairros marginais onde a polícia só entra em força não são a outra face do problema que gera as gated communities (traduzida no livro como comunidades muradas e não como condomínios fechados). E aquilo que lá se diz não é contraditado, no essencial, pelo que é dito por alguns conservadores (real conservatives)como se poderia cotejar com aquilo que vem abaixo.

No Irish Economy, sob a epígrafe Real conservatives have always worried about social cohesion dizia-se a propósito do artigo que se referencia abaixo:...which is why it makes sense that this article should have appeared in the Telegraph rather than the Guardian (HT FT Alphaville). O artigo, escrito num jornal conservador, é magnífico pela sua lucidez.




No one seemed surprised. Not the hooded teenagers fleeing home at dawn. Not Ken and Tony, who used to live in Tottenham and had returned to stand vigil over the missiles and torched cars littering an urban war zone. Tony claimed to have seen the whole thing coming. “This was always going to happen,” he said.The police shot a black guy in suspicious circumstances. Feral kids with no jobs ran amok. To Tony’s mind, this was a riot waiting for an excuse. In the hangover of the violence that spread through London, the uprisings seemed both inevitable and unthinkable. Over a few days in which attacks became a contagion the capital city of an advanced nation has reverted to a Hobbesian dystopia of chaos and brutality.“In the evening there is fear, and in the morning they are gone. This is the fate of those who take our goods, and the reward of those who violently take our property.” Isaiah 17:14. No such Old Testament fate awaited the pillagers of N18, strolling away from 21st-century megastores with a looted haul of iPod accessories and designer trainers.This is the most arcane of uprisings and the most modern. Its participants, marshalled by Twitter, are protagonists in a sinister flipside to the Arab Spring. The Tottenham summer, featuring children as young as seven, is an assault not on a regime of tyranny but on the established order of a benign democracy. One question now hangs over London’s battle-torn high streets. How could this ever happen?Among several obvious answers, one is a failure of policing. The evidence so far points to more ignominy for the rudderless Met, as doubts emerge over whether Mark Duggan, whose death inspired the initial riots, fired at police. The stonewalling of Mr Duggan’s family precipitated the crisis, and the absence of officers to intervene in an orgy of looting led to a breakdown of order suggestive of the lawless badlands of a failing state.
The second alleged culprit is ethnicity. But, as David Lammy, Tottenham’s MP, has said, these are no race riots. The Eighties uprisings at Broadwater Farm, as in Toxteth and Brixton, were products, in part, of a poisonous racism absent in today’s Tottenham, where the Chinese grocery, the Turkish store and the African hairdresser’s sit side by side.

So blame unemployment and the cuts. It is true that Tottenham is among London’s poorest boroughs, with 10,000 people claiming jobseeker’s allowance and 54 applicants chasing every registered job vacancy. In other affected boroughs, such as Hackney, youth clubs are closing. Unwise as such pruning may be, it would be facile to suggest that homes and businesses have been laid waste for want of ping-pong tournaments and skateboard parks.

The real causes are more insidious. It is no coincidence that the worst violence London has seen in many decades takes place against the backdrop of a global economy poised for freefall. The causes of recession set out by J K Galbraith in his book, The Great Crash 1929, were as follows: bad income distribution, a business sector engaged in “corporate larceny”, a weak banking structure and an import/export imbalance.

All those factors are again in play. In the bubble of the 1920s, the top 5 per cent of earners creamed off one-third of personal income. Today, Britain is less equal, in wages, wealth and life chances, than at any time since then. Last year alone, the combined fortunes of the 1,000 richest people in Britain rose by 30 per cent to £333.5 billion.

Europe’s leaders, our own Prime Minister and Chancellor included, were parked on sun-loungers as London burned. Although the epicentre of the immediate economic crisis is the eurozone, successive British governments have colluded in incubating the poverty, the inequality and the inhumanity now exacerbated by financial turmoil.

Britain’s lack of growth is not an economic debating point or a stick with which to beat George Osborne, any more than our deskilled, demotivated, under-educated non-workforce is simply a blot on the national balance sheet. Watch the juvenile wrecking crews on the city streets and weep for all our futures. The “lost generation” is mustering for war.

This is not a cri de coeur for the failed and failing. Nor is it a lament for the impoverished. Mob violence, despicable and inexcusable, must always be condemned. But those terrorising and trashing London are also a symptom of a wider malaise. In uneasy societies, people power – whether offered or stolen – can be toxic. Most of the 53 per cent of e‑democrats calling to have the death penalty reinstated (of whom 8 per cent would opt for firing squad or gas chamber) would never dream of torching a police car, but their impulses hardly cohere either with David Cameron’s utopian ambitions.
What price for the Big Society as Tottenham, the most solid of communities, lies in ruins? The notion that small-state Britain can be run along the lines of Ambridge parish council by good-hearted, if under-funded, volunteers has never seemed more doubtful. Nor can Ed Miliband take much credit for his unvaried focus on the “squeezed middle”, rather than on a vote-losing underclass that politicians ignore at their peril, and at ours.

London’s riots are not the Tupperware troubles of Greece or Spain, where the middle classes lash out against their day of reckoning. They are the proof that a section of young Britain – the stabbers, shooters, looters, chancers and their frightened acolytes – has fallen off the cliff-edge of a crumbling nation.

The failure of the markets goes hand in hand with human blight. Meanwhile, the view is gaining ground that social democracy, with its safety nets, its costly education and health care for all, is unsustainable in the bleak times ahead. The reality is that it is the only solution. After the Great Crash, Britain recalibrated, for a time. Income differentials fell, the welfare state was born and skills and growth increased.

That exact model is not replicable, but nor, as Adam Smith recognised, can a well-ordered society ever develop when a sizeable number of its members are miserable and, as a consequence, dangerous. This is not a gospel of determinism, for poverty does not ordain lawlessness. Nor, however, is it sufficient to heap contempt on the rioters as if they are a pariah caste.

One of the most tragic aspects of London’s meltdowns is that we need this ruined generation if Britain is ever to feel prosperous and safe again. If there are no jobs for today’s malcontents and no means to exploit their skills, then the UK is in graver trouble than it thinks. Mr Osborne may congratulate himself on his prudence, but retrenchment also bears a social cost. We are seeing just how steep that price may be.

Financial crashes and human catastrophes are cyclical. Each reoccurrence threatens to be graver than the last. As Galbraith wrote, “memory is far better than the law” in protecting against financial illusion and insanity. In an age of austerity, there are diverse luxuries that Britain can no longer afford. Amnesia stands high on that long list.

Género: O que está a acontecer com os rapazes? O que está acontecer com as raparigas? E como é que a evolução sócio-económica, caso da classe média nos EUA, cruza com isso??




"Psychologist Philip Zimbardo asks, 'Why are boys struggling?' He shares some stats (lower graduation rates, greater worries about intimacy and relationships) and suggests a few reasons -- and he asks for your help! Watch his talk, then take his short 10-question survey: http://on.ted.com/PZSurvey"

What’s Happening to Men? | Kay Hymowitz | Cato Unbound

Women today are entering adulthood with more education, more achievements, more property, and, arguably, more money and ambition than their male counterparts. This is a first in human history, and its implications for both sexes are far from simple.

You can see the strongest evidence that boys and young men are falling behind in high school and college classrooms. Boys have lower GPAs and lower grades in almost every subject, including math, despite their higher standardized testing scores.[1] They are 58% of high school dropouts.[2] In the mid 1970s about 28% of men had college degrees. Since then, that number has barely budged. Meanwhile, the percentage of women with a college degree increased from 18.6 to 34.2%.[3] Women now earn 57% of college degrees; predictions have them at 60% in the near future.

People often assume that this “boy problem” as it is sometimes called, is really a “low-income boy problem,” primarily affecting Blacks and Hispanics. It’s true that the human capital disparities between women and men are especially pronounced in these groups. But there are signs that higher income boys are also falling behind. 

Can the Middle Class Be Saved? - Magazine - The Atlantic

In October 2005, three Citigroup analysts released a report describing the pattern of growth in the U.S. economy. To really understand the future of the economy and the stock market, they wrote, you first needed to recognize that there was “no such animal as the U.S. consumer,” and that concepts such as “average” consumer debt and “average” consumer spending were highly misleading.

In fact, they said, America was composed of two distinct groups: the rich and the rest. And for the purposes of investment decisions, the second group didn’t matter; tracking its spending habits or worrying over its savings rate was a waste of time. All the action in the American economy was at the top: the richest 1 percent of households earned as much each year as the bottom 60 percent put together; they possessed as much wealth as the bottom 90 percent; and with each passing year, a greater share of the nation’s treasure was flowing through their hands and into their pockets. It was this segment of the population, almost exclusively, that held the key to future growth and future returns. The analysts, Ajay Kapur, Niall Macleod, and Narendra Singh, had coined a term for this state of affairs: plutonomy.

6 de agosto de 2011

Diminuição da notação dos EUA: essas seriam boas razões para que isso tenha acontecido

Não estou tão seguro que a notação dos EUA tenha sido diminuído pelas razões abaixo indicados, mas que devia tê-lo sido por isso, disso não tenho dúvida. A nota referenciada abaixo deveria ser lida na totalidade; reproduzo de novo o último gráfico por ser tão sugestivo, e para quem não tem presente o que mede o coeficiente de Gini ver aqui (nota da wikipédia em espanhol porque esta tem informação sobre os valores assumidos por esse coeficiente em diversos países - exemplos de 2007: EUA, 45; Portugal, 38; Suécia, 23).


The decision of Standard & Poor to downgrade the credit rating of the United States of America from AAA to AA+ was clearly based on uncertainty in two major areas. The first and least important was the wrangling on the debt ceiling, which took the US to the brink of not being able to meet its debt servicing obligations for as long as the impasse lasted. The second was the increasing refusal of the American business classes to pay their fair share of taxes.



Clicar para aceder a versões maiores