Willem Buiter apresenta no seu blogue, em FT.com Willem Buiter's Maverecon After the Crisis: Macro Imbalance, Credibility and Reserve-Currency , a narrativa que o economista brasileiro André Lara Resende faz do que motivou a crise, do que se pode esperar, em termos de eficácia, das medidas de política económica tomadas até agora, e do que mais provavelmente nos espera. É aquilo que de melhor li sobre o tópico. A conclusão não é animadora. Alguns excertos: a apresentação de Willem Buiter, e depois, alguns para suscitar a leitura:
"Today’s guest blogger is Dr. André Lara Resende, a well-known Brazilian economist. [...] I am particularly intrigued by Lara Resende’s argument that this downturn is different from all past downturns, including the Great Depression of the 1930s, because of the continuing high level of private sector indebtedness, and that under these conditions neither monetary policy nor Keynesian fiscal policies are likely to be effective. [...]"
" [...] The US will most likely face a long period of stagnation. The option for an aggressive and heterodox monetary policy should avoid a depression like the one of the thirties, when GDP fell nearly 50% and unemployment reached more than 30% of the labor force. There is however a trade-off: the digestion of excessive debt of the private sector will take several years. Since the excess of debt is relative to income and GDP, the lower the rate of growth, the longer the required period of digestion. Or inversely, the stronger is aggregate demand, the higher the growth rate and the faster is the digestion of the excessive debt. This explains for the paradox of trying to stimulate consumption when the economy faces a monumental crisis provoked exactly by excessive debt and excessive consumption. A cartoon line best captured the spirit of it: “country addicted to speculative bubbles desperately searches a new bubble to invest in. ”
"[...] Let us resume the argument. The roots of the crisis are major international macroeconomic imbalances. Despite the fact that the excesses of the financial system were instrumental to lead these imbalances further than otherwise possible, insufficient regulation should not be viewed as the main factor behind the crisis. The expenditure of central countries, spinned by all sort of financial innovations created by a globalized financial system, was the engine of world growth. When debt became clearly excessive in central countries and the debt-financed expenditure cycle came to an end, the ensuing crisis paralyzed the world economy. With the lesson of 1929 well assimilated, American monetary policy became aggressively expansionist. The Fed inundated the economy with money and credit, in the attempt to avoid a deep depression. Even if successful, the economies of the US and the other central countries, given the burden of excessive debt, are likely to remain stagnant under the threat of deflation for the coming years. The assumption of troubled assets by the public sector, in order to avoid the collapse of the financial system, might succeed, but at the cost of a major increase in public debt. Fiscal policy is not efficient to restart the economy when the private sector remains paralyzed by excessive debt. Even if a coordinated effort to increase public expenditure is successful, the central economies will remain stagnant for as long as the excessive indebtedness of the private sector persists. The period of digestion of excess debt will be longer than the usual recessive cycle. Since imports represent a drain in the effort to reanimate domestic demand through public expenditure, while exports, on the contrary, contribute to the recovery of internal demand, the temptation to central economies to also adopt a protectionist stance will be strong. [...]"
"[...] Let us resume the argument. The roots of the crisis are major international macroeconomic imbalances. Despite the fact that the excesses of the financial system were instrumental to lead these imbalances further than otherwise possible, insufficient regulation should not be viewed as the main factor behind the crisis. The expenditure of central countries, spinned by all sort of financial innovations created by a globalized financial system, was the engine of world growth. When debt became clearly excessive in central countries and the debt-financed expenditure cycle came to an end, the ensuing crisis paralyzed the world economy. With the lesson of 1929 well assimilated, American monetary policy became aggressively expansionist. The Fed inundated the economy with money and credit, in the attempt to avoid a deep depression. Even if successful, the economies of the US and the other central countries, given the burden of excessive debt, are likely to remain stagnant under the threat of deflation for the coming years. The assumption of troubled assets by the public sector, in order to avoid the collapse of the financial system, might succeed, but at the cost of a major increase in public debt. Fiscal policy is not efficient to restart the economy when the private sector remains paralyzed by excessive debt. Even if a coordinated effort to increase public expenditure is successful, the central economies will remain stagnant for as long as the excessive indebtedness of the private sector persists. The period of digestion of excess debt will be longer than the usual recessive cycle. Since imports represent a drain in the effort to reanimate domestic demand through public expenditure, while exports, on the contrary, contribute to the recovery of internal demand, the temptation to central economies to also adopt a protectionist stance will be strong. [...]"
Sem comentários:
Enviar um comentário