Não tenho arrumado as leituras com a diligência requerida. Estas referências são anteriores às decisões do Conselho Europeu sobre o pacote de estímulos à economia, aí aprovado - não li ainda nada sobre o que sucedeu.
Os artigos abaixo indicados abarcam um leque de assuntos recorrentes nas últimas semanas: sobre a política económica mais indicada a seguir; sobre a dimensão dos multiplicadores da política orçamental; sobre o comportamento do Governo Alemão; sobre a questão da adesão do RU ao EURO, etc.
- FT.com / Brussels - ‘Limited’ boost from EU stimulus package:
"The EU’s economic stimulus package, unveiled late last month, is likely to boost the 27-country bloc’s gross domestic product by only about 0.6 per cent, a prominent Brussels think-tank is suggesting." FT.com / Comment / Opinion - The fiscal cure may make the patient worse:
"The fiscal cure may make the patient worse. As the financial crisis attacks the economy, there is growing pressure on governments around the world to introduce fiscal stimulus programmes. This follows big interventions in the financial sector, massive easing of monetary policy, especially in the US, and substantial loosening of fiscal policy. The fact that there are time lags between these interventions and their effects seems to have been ignored. The assumption appears to be that fiscal stimulus will automatically revive private spending. But this belief contrasts with data that show there is considerable uncertainty about the size and nature of the stimulus required to cause spending to increase." ...
"Research suggests that when the ratio of public debt to gross domestic product is already high, the multiplier effect of fiscal stimulus is low. In extreme cases, fiscal expansion may even be contractionary." ...
"One of the reasons banks are reluctant to lend is they have insufficient capital. According to the International Monetary Fund’s recent “Global Financial Stability Report,” banks need globally almost $700bn (€540bn, £474bn) of additional capital. A simultaneous large borrowing by governments to finance their fiscal stimulus could make it more difficult for banks to gain access to global capital markets and possibly limit any increases in their capital and lending."Economist's View: "Measuring the Effect of Infrastructure Spending on GDP":
"Measuring the Effect of Infrastructure Spending on GDP" Susan Woodward and Bob Hall say the multiplier for infrastructure spending is likely to be around 1.0.""Crass Keynesianism" Free exchange Economist.com:
"Paul Krugman comments: [T]he European economy is so integrated: European countries on average spend around a quarter of their GDP on imports from each other. Since imports tend to rise or fall faster than GDP during a business cycle, this probably means that something like 40 percent of any change in final demand “leaks” across borders within Europe.
As a result, the multiplier on fiscal policy within any given European country is much less than the multiplier on a coordinated fiscal expansion. And that in turn means that the tradeoff between deficits and supporting the economy in a time of trouble is much less favorable for any one European country than for Europe as a whole.
It is, in short, a classic example of the kind of situation in which policy coordination is essential — but you won’t get coordination if policymakers in the biggest European economy refuse to go along. And if Germany prevents an effective European response, this adds significantly to the severity of the global downturn. In short, there’s a huge multiplier effect at work; unfortunately, what it’s doing is multiplying the impact of the current German government’s boneheadedness."Economist's View: Jobs:
"I still don't get the sense that legislators appreciate the lags in the policy process and hence the urgency to get something done now: Nosedive, by Paul Krugman: Another day, another terrifying economic report, this time on unemployment claims. So are we now losing jobs at the rate of 600,000 a month? 700,000? If fiscal expansion takes, say, 8 months to kick in (and that’s optimistic), where will that leave us? I also used 8 months as an estimate of the time until the peak effect of a fiscal policy change is felt in the economy, and with lags that long, policy needs to be implemented without delay."Saving the economy and the planet: complements or substitutes? vox - Research-based policy analysis and commentary from leading economists:
Isto cruza com aquilo que foi referido aqui (veja-se o sublinhado): "Policy makers might be worried that that such spending has only a very indirect effect on output and employment. Moreover they might be more inclined to implement measures that are more directly felt in the purses of voters. A measure in this spirit could be subsidies for energy saving refurbishments of houses which would help the hard hit building industries as well as the house owners by reducing energy bills."FT.com / Columnists / Philip Stephens - Never mind the recession – save the pound:
"There is anyway a counterfactual counter case: a decision to join the euro would have forced big policy changes. The government would have been obliged to run a much tighter fiscal policy, and to have acted to cool an overheated housing market
[Não aconteceu em Portugal - e como isso seria feito? Promovendo o mercado de arrendamento, de modo mais eficaz, do que foi feito, mas isso, deveria ter sido feito, no longo prazo, e sempre foi difícil cá].
The boom would have been moderated, and so too would have been the bust. Yes, Britain has had stronger growth than some (not all) eurozone economies. It also faces a deeper recession than most. Mr Brown, one supposes, will now drop the lectures to fellow Europeans on the virtues of unfettered financial innovation. The global crisis has exposed the delusion that Britain’s liberal financial capitalism was inherently superior to the social market model favoured by its eurozone neighbours . Over time, this will change the terms of Britain’s euro debate."L’Europe ne croit pas à la récession Telos:
"Au total, les preuves d’une récession ne sont pas aussi évidentes qu’aux Etats-Unis, au Royaume-Uni ou en Espagne. Partant, les plans de soutien en Europe continentale sont plus modestes : ils reflètent le sentiment que la moindre importance des secteurs financier et immobilier pourrait résulter en une moindre récession ; que l’efficacité des politiques budgétaires des autres (hors Europe) viendra pallier la récession globale et donc soutiendra les exports à la zone euro ; que la résilience européenne qu’est cette capacité particulière à chuter moins vite et remonter plus lentement, joue encore. Les gouvernements de la zone euro ne croient pas à une récession sévère, imminente, aussi brutale qu’aux Etats-Unis, au Royaume-Uni ou en Espagne : ont-ils tort ?"
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