27 de março de 2009

Conjuntura económica: Zona Euro






"The Euro-Zone composite Purchasing Managers Index (PMI) rose slightly in March (to 37.6) from the record low of 36.2 registered in February. The PMI reading for manufacturing rose to 34.0 (from 33.6) while the services component was up to 40.1 (from 38.9). (You need to bear in mind that 50 is the neutral point (marking the boundary between expansion and contraction) on these indexes, and any reading below 40 means a very significant rate of contraction).



So it now seems virtually certain that the Q1 Eurozone GDP contraction will be far worse than the Q4 2008 one. Taking into account that the eurozone contracted by 0.2% in Q3 2008, and by 1.5% in Q4, then, in my humble opinion, the data we are seeing for this quarter are entirely consistent with a 2% quarterly contraction (or an annualised 8% rate of contraction) or more. As I said last month, not quite Japan territory yet, but certainly not far behind. And for those who simply don’t believe the PMIs can tell you so much, here is Markit’s own chart, showing the strong underlying relationship between movements in GDP and the *flash* composite PMI. Pretty impressive I would say."







- continuar a ler em The Euro-Zone March PMI Holds Near February’s Record-Low afoe A Fistful of Euros European Opinion.

Saúde: as experiências dos outros (II)






"It is common knowledge that the cost of Medicare and Medicaid will grow to become an unsustainably large part of the US federal budget in coming decades. Perhaps less well known is that more than 80 percent of the projected increases derive from “excess cost growth,” unrelated to expansion in coverage or the effects of an ageing population. Excess cost growth refers to the fact that the cost of treating each beneficiary is growing faster than the growth in nominal US per capita GDP.
1 In other words, the problem stems from it becoming more and more expensive to treat each person and not increases in the number of people covered. It’s the cost (not the demography) stupid!"

- continuar a ler em RGE - What Comparing Healthcare Costs Really Reveals. Mais do que enfatizar as diferenças com os EUA, importa é pensar na tendência referida acima (ela será comum a todos os sistemas de saúde - recordam-se? ... para a saúde tem de haver sempre dinheiro!), insistir na reflexão de como se pode tornar o sistema mais eficiente - não é de modo algum uma questão de mero controlo contabilístico (embora ele faça falta) - não esquecendo que o combate pela eficiência de um qualquer sistema, é sempre um pressuposto da sua eficácia.

Ainda sobre o plano do Tesouro norte-americano e o início da retoma

Transcrito do RGE Monitor's Newsletter (podem subscrever):



Ainda sobre o plano do Tesouro norte-americano (ver aqui, também):





"[...] Nouriel argues that the Geithner plan is not an alternative to nationalization. In his view, insolvent banks should be nationalized and the Geithner plan should not apply to them. But solvent banks still need to have their toxic assets disposed of; and for these banks the Geithner plan provides a solution that - all in all - is better than the alternative. Those who don’t like the Geithner plan on the basis that they prefer nationalization are right that the insolvent banks should be nationalized. But they usually don’t give an explanation of how they would dispose of the toxic assets of solvent banks. Also, those who criticize the Geithner plan as a solution to the toxic assets of solvent banks should come up with an alternative that works and that is less costly to the government than the Geithner plan. Check out: “New York Times Deal Book: Dr. Doom Finds Promise in Obama’s Toxic-Asset Plan” and Geithner Presents a Viable Plan to Dispose of the Toxic Assets...that Does Not Rule Out that Insolvent Banks Should be Taken Over” .






Ainda sobre o início da retoma (ver aqui, para a discussão das "letras" referidas abaixo):




"The light at the end of the tunnel may be the one of the recovery of growth after a long and ugly U-shaped global recession or that of the incoming train wreck of an L-shaped global near-depression. Avoiding the L is possible but it requires much more coherent and aggressive policy actions in the US, China and all over the world. So stay tuned for the details. Read: “Update on the Global Macro and Policy Outlook” and “Article summarizing the US and global economic outlook”"

25 de março de 2009

Há coisas a vir - piores do que a crise (e eu gostava de estar enganado a esse respeito)

"I am shocked, truly shocked,' says Katey Walter, an ecologist at the University of Alaska in Fairbanks. 'I was in Siberia a few weeks ago, and I am now just back in from the field in Alaska. The permafrost is melting fast all over the Arctic, lakes are forming everywhere and methane is bubbling up out of them.'

Back in 2006, in a paper in Nature, Walter warned that as the permafrost in Siberia melted, growing methane emissions could accelerate climate change. But even she was not expecting such a rapid change. 'Lakes in Siberia are five times bigger than when I measured them in 2006. It's unprecedented. This is a global event now, and the inertia for more permafrost melt is increasing.'"
Continuar a ler em Arctic meltdown is a threat to humanity.

A formação intelectual de um Presidente

Através da nota Obamanomics - Freakonomics Blog - NYTimes.com fui levado a ler: President Obama the intellectual -- chicagotribune.com. Muito interessante, mas ecoando em parte aquilo que o New York Times relatava antes das eleições (ver aqui).

O "apelo popular" de um prémio Nobel de Economia




O vídeo acima, foi-me referenciado por Economist's View: "A Song, A Plea".



Podem aceder a este "link": Paul Krugman & Donald Marron discuss Geithner’s plan The Big Picture, e assistir à discussão do plano do Tesouro norte-americano.

Enquanto isso, na Europa ...




PS: Aproveito para referenciar um artigo interessante de Pedro Magalhães sobre as temáticas das próximas eleições europeias: Outras Margens: A Europa possível. A comentar, eventualmente, um dia destes.

PS (2009.03.26): E este Timothy Garton Ash: The G20 summit in London will be missing one great power. Europe Comment is free The Guardian
























O plano do Tesouro norte-americano

A discussão sobre os méritos do plano do Tesouro, para reavivar o adequado funcionamento do sistema financeiro norte-americano, vai acessa. É impossível cobri-la toda. Basicamente, até onde posso ver, ou a Administração Obama está a cometer um erro estratégico grave, ou está a ser, tacticamente, brilhante: este plano seria um passo exigido pelo desconhecimento real da extensão dos problemas (a concretização do plano irá pô-los a descoberto) e pelas condicionantes políticas (e legais) onde se move (o limite da maioria democrata no Congresso), dando lugar, a posteriori, face à evidência, a outro tipo de medidas mais drásticas (e.g., nacionalizações).






















Mark Thoma explica em Economist's View: Government Intervention in the Market for Toxic Cars, de modo muito (muito) pedagógico, o que foi proposto, e quais são as alternativas; Brad DeLong Grasping Reality with Both Hands: The Geithner Plan FAQ, explica também e de modo também pedagógico; Krugman, que já ia dizendo que tinha dúvidas sobre o que se enunciava, em Despair over financial policy - Paul Krugman Blog - NYTimes.com, concretiza a sua discordância em Op-Ed Columnist - Financial Policy Despair - NYTimes.com ; Brad DeLong explica, em Grasping Reality with Both Hands: I Think Paul Krugman Is Wrong, porque razão considera que Krugman não tem razão, mas acrescenta, à cautela o seguinte: "I find that a scary sentence to write. If the past decade has taught me anything, it has taught me that mistakes are avoided if you follow two rules: Remember that Paul Krugman is right. If your analysis leads you to conclude that Paul Krugman is wrong, refer to rule #1."; outros explicam também, mas de modo muito mais denso, em RGE - The Public-Private Partnership Investment Program (PPIP) – Will It Work?; Sachs não concorda, igualmente: Geithner plan: A massive taxpayer transfer to bank shareholders vox - Research-based policy analysis and commentary from leading economists.






Deste lado do oceano, existe gente muito preocupada com a política económica dos EUA (mas não só): Martin Wolf, do FT, começa este seu artigo FT.com / Columnists / Martin Wolf - Successful bank rescue still far away, do seguinte modo:









"I am becoming ever more worried. I never expected much from the Europeans or the Japanese. But I did expect the US, under a popular new president, to be more decisive than it has been. Instead, the Congress is indulging in a populist frenzy; and the administration is hoping for the best. If anybody doubts the dangers, they need only read the latest
analysis from the International Monetary Fund. It expects world output to shrink by between 0.5 per cent and 1 per cent this year and the economies of the advanced countries to shrink by between 3 and 3.5 per cent. This is unquestionably the worst global economic crisis since the 1930s."























24 de março de 2009

Europa e a conjuntura: diversos

Os artigos referidos aqui, todos, de um modo ou outro, têm a crise como pano de fundo, mas, também, têm preocupações, digamos, mais políticas, estratégicas, ou apelam para a reflexão de aspectos económicos da União Europeia que nos diferenciam da experiência anglo-saxónica.
  1. "I am ready to retire as a eurosceptic. The European Union is in trouble. But rather than smirking – which would be the normal reaction of a sceptic – I am alarmed [...]

    But it is precisely the threat to the EU that has focused my mind. Plans for a political union in Europe were always crazy. But the four freedoms already established by the EU – free movement of goods, people, services and capital – are huge and tangible achievements. It would be terrible to see them rolled back."
  2. FT.com / Comment / Opinion - Flexibility gives way to rigidity’s virtues
    [...] The idea that flexibility is good and rigidity is bad continues to influence the minds of policymakers and analysts. Rating agencies, for example, continue to give a more favourable rating to US and UK sovereign debt based on the notion that the greater flexibility of these countries gives them a better capacity to adjust to the crisis than rigid countries such as Spain, Italy and Ireland. The opposite is true. Today, rigidities in wages, employment and social security allow countries to deal better with the great rigidity that the fixed levels of debt impose on households and companies. We should cherish these rigidities.

Europa e a conjuntura: a polémica sobre se a Europa está a fazer o suficiente.


Estão em curso, a-propósito da crise, duas polémicas interessantes, abrangendo ambas, Paul Krugman. Numa ele critica o plano apresentado pelo Secretário do Tesouro norte-americano para pôr em ordem a banca (talvez, amanhã, faça o ponto do que tem sido escrito a esse respeito); noutra, ele critica a actuação da União Europeia quanto ao combate à crise - não está sozinho nessa crítica - mas, o que é mais grave (para mim, mas para muita outra gente) sugere que o Euro poderá ter sido um erro, aliás, numa linha que é habitual a muitos economistas norte-americanos.



Essa questão do Euro fica para outra ocasião - para já fica a polémica. O artigo de Krugman é o primeiro.



  1. Op-Ed Columnist - A Continent Adrift - NYTimes.com
    "Why is Europe falling short? Poor leadership is part of the story. European banking officials, who completely missed the depth of the crisis, still seem weirdly complacent. And to hear anything in America comparable to the know-nothing diatribes of Germany’s finance minister you have to listen to, well, Republicans. But there’s a deeper problem: Europe’s economic and monetary integration has run too far ahead of its political institutions. [...]
    Now Spain needs to find new sources of income and employment to replace the lost jobs in construction. In the past, Spain would have sought improved competitiveness by devaluing its currency. But now it’s on the euro — and the only way forward seems to be a grinding process of wage cuts. This process would have been difficult in the best of times; it will be almost inconceivably painful if, as seems all too likely, the European economy as a whole is depressed and tending toward deflation for years to come. Does all this mean that Europe was wrong to let itself become so tightly integrated? Does it mean, in particular, that the creation of the euro was a mistake? Maybe. But Europe can still prove the skeptics wrong, if its politicians start showing more leadership. Will they?"


  2. RGE - A Nobel-prize winner adrift

    "I don’t know whether it’s my European blood raging or my dismay with Paul Krugman’s degeneration from an academic I admired to a dogmatic commentator who banks on his economist’s reputation to promote a narrow political ideology. Krugman’s latest “prey” are European policymakers, in an op-ed piece that is so shallow and uncorroborated in its assertions, and so one-size-fits-all in its prescriptions, that it might have well been written by an American freshman student of European studies in a rush to finish his midterm exam."

  3. ECB Official Lorenzo Bini Smaghi Responds to Criticism From Paul Krugman - Real Time Economics - WSJ
    "In a recent article in the International Herald Tribune, Professor Paul Krugman states that Europe may have made a mistake in adopting the euro ten years ago. His point, he claims, is corroborated by the euro area’s apparent institutional inability to react to the severe crisis we are facing at present, an inability which, he claims, may have disastrous results. The claims made in the article are in no way supported by empirical evidence. [...]
    Let’s get the facts straight, starting with the question of fiscal policy, an area in which – according to Krugman – Europe has failed, more so than the United States, to enact an effective recovery policy. This conflicts with recent IMF calculations, which show that the fiscal stimulus in European countries is wholly comparable to that seen in the United States, particularly when taking into account measures to cushion the effect of automatic stabilisers, which, by contrast with the United States, are a major factor in Europe. For instance, for the period 2009-10, discretionary measures adopted in Germany total 3.5% of GDP, compared with 3.8%in the United States.
    In some European countries, such as Italy, the size of such stimulus measures is relatively limited owing to the high levels of debt, but in other countries the total fiscal stimulus is larger than in the United States.
    The perception that more has been done in the United States probably stems from the extensive financial measures adopted in support of the US banking system. It should be pointed out, however, that the US banking system was in greater need of such measures than the European banking system. When overall stimulus measures are considered in relation to the situation, the differences are indeed fairly limited.
    As regards monetary policy, the degree of stimulus can be better measured by comparing market interest rates, rather than official interest rates. Such a comparison shows that European rates are more or less in line with those observed in the United States, and are even lower in some cases. For example, 6 and 12-month interbank interest rates in Europe are slightly lower than their US equivalents. Furthermore, real interest rates – i.e. net of inflation – are markedly lower in Europe than in the United States, and retail interest rates on mortgage lending and lending to non-financial corporations are of a comparable magnitude, if not somewhat lower in Europe.
    As regards action taken by the central bank, following the initial liquidity injection of in excess of €90 billion in August 2007, the ECB’s balance sheet has steadily grown, increasing by approximately €600 billion to reach a level of 16% of GDP (compared with 13% of GDP for the US Federal Reserve). There is a major difference, however: the ECB lends to the banking system against collateral, thereby reducing the risks for European taxpayers.
    According to Krugman, the fact that the ECB does not have a government behind it which can cover any losses accounts for its being overly cautious. However, this assumption implies that the taxpayer should bear the burden – through inflation – of the difficulties experienced by the banking system. I’m not so sure that this is what US citizens want, and it is certainly not what people in Europe want. To sum up, Krugman’s argument is that it is better to have only one decision-maker in a crisis, rather than 16 governments which need to coordinate their actions, as is the case in the euro area. In theory, this seems reasonable.
    But it doesn’t explain how the most fateful decision of all – the decision to allow a systemically important bank to fail in the midst of a financial crisis – was taken by a single decision-maker, while the 16 euro area governments have managed to avoid making such a large mistake.
    Neither does it explain how euro area governments have managed to agree on measures aimed at bank recapitalization, at guarantees to bank liabilities and on principles for removing toxic assets from banks’ balance sheets, decisions which have become a point of reference for all the countries of the G20. Krugman concludes that countries such as Spain would have been better off without the euro. Again, in theory he has a point, since devaluing one’s currency might seem attractive in the current circumstances. In practice, however, when global trade grinds to a halt and the financial market is in distress, the depreciation of a currency can trigger a loss of market confidence in the country, which can further aggravate the economic and financial crisis. This is what happened in Italy in 1992-93, for example. Krugman should travel to those European countries which do not yet have the euro and would really like to introduce it as soon as possible; he would not fail to notice that the reality is very different from textbooks economic theory. Nobody can claim that Europe is perfect; quite the opposite. We should continue to strengthen economic integration and the coordination of financial and economic policies. We just need to build on what we already have, in particular the euro. Lorenzo Bini Smaghi"

  4. Transatlantic divergence in tackling the crisis, by Charles Wyplosz, Vox EU:
    "While the US calls for a coordinated macroeconomic policy reaction to the ongoing recession, France and Germany are calling for microeconomic measures to prevent the next crisis. While the US is concerned about mounting unemployment and the associated distress of millions of households, France and Germany worry about their public debts. The G20 will not be able to paper over these differences, which reflect deep divergences in the way economic policies are prepared and understood. Denial in Europe It all looks like France and Germany, among other European countries, failed to realise the depth of the recession and the historical hardship that it is gradually creating. Alternatively, it looks like the US authorities are needlessly panicking, sowing the seeds of an outburst of inflation and massive public debt. History will eventually tell who is right. A good bet is that the Europeans are in denial or, worse that they cynically count on the US budget deficit to pull the world out of the recession. After all, the US is where the crisis was created."

Europa e a conjuntura económica: o que fazer?



Existem sérias preocupações sobre se a União Europeia está a fazer o suficiente, quer no que respeita à sua parte no esforço global de combate à crise, quer no que respeita ao que deveria fazer internamente quanto, por exemplo, ao tipo de instrumentos a que poderia e deveria recorrer. Por outro lado, discute-se o que se deverá fazer se houver o perigo de um EM (estado membro) ir à falência, e qual a actuação da política económica que tem de ser seguida.


O conjunto de artigos indicados abaixo abrangem tudo isso (e não estão ordenados por datas) e, alguns, falam de situações particulares:




  1. FT.com / Columnists / Wolfgang Munchau - Collective action on the crisis is our best hope
    "Policymakers by and large understand there is a crisis. But many of them, including a majority of European leaders in particular, still underestimate its likely impact; and, more importantly, they misjudge the dynamics. They congratulate themselves on the moderate stimulus packages they have been able to agree on. [...] This attitude worked in the past because Europe generally relied on the US to create global demand. [...] This time, the US will not be able to create a global recovery on its own. Tim Geithner, US Treasury secretary, and Larry Summers, director of the National Economic Council under President Barack Obama, have pushed for a co-ordinated response by the Group of 20 summit in London on April 2. [...] The French and the Germans want the G20 summit to focus only on the long-term issues. [...]
    The case for global co-ordination is overwhelming. There are at least three issues that could be tackled far more effectively by the G20 than by national governments alone. The first is a co-ordinated stimulus. The economic rationale for co-ordination is to increase the effectiveness of the stimulus – the so-called multiplier. [...] The second issue is crisis prevention. We are facing the problem of a massive withdrawal of finance from central and eastern European (CEE) countries. [...] Third, there is a need for global co-ordination when we finally come to sort out the banking system. There are some huge cross-country spillovers. "


  2. European government bailouts: Should we let one go broke? vox - Research-based policy analysis and commentary from leading economists:
    "Some European governments are contemplating bailouts of other European governments. This column argues that violating the Eurozone’s no-bailout clause this soon would be a mistake. Much as it was necessary to let Lehman Brothers go down before bailing out the remaining banks, it may be necessary to let a profligate government default and ask for IMF assistance."



  3. Silva Lopes defende congelamento e redução de salários - Expresso.pt

    O ex-ministro das Finanças, José Silva Lopes, defendeu hoje o congelamento dos salários da generalidade dos portugueses e uma redução dos salários mais elevados, como uma medida de combate à crise. A-propósito desta posição ver The Long And Difficult Road To Wage Cuts As An Alternative To Devaluation afem A Few Euros More More European Opinion.




  4. FT.com / Columnists / Martin Wolf - Why saving the world economy should be affordable
    "[...] there is also a current agenda: rebalancing of world demand. Surplus countries subcontract to their trading partners the job of spending oneself into bankruptcy, while lecturing the latter on their profligacy. Thus the reason the US, the UK and Spain have huge fiscal deficits is that they are offsetting the collapse of private spending at home and the export of demand abroad. This is unsustainable, in the long run. The danger now is that the surplus countries expect recovery to come from enormous and sustained fiscal expansion in deficit countries. Some analysts argue that the US should have refused to take fiscal action at all, leaving it to surplus countries. Unfortunately, that would have meant a global depression. Nevertheless, without rebalancing there can be no healthy recovery. On this point, the US is right and Germany is wrong."

Europa e a conjuntura económica: o leste

Vou, finalmente, arrumar, em diversas notas, um conjunto de referências sobre a conjuntura e a Europa, que tinha vindo a acumular.










Um dos aspectos que está a marcar a agenda europeia, é o que se passa no leste europeu - o leste que pertence à União Europeia (os EM que entraram na última ronda do alargamento) e o que não pertence. O que se passa é grave, e não foi ainda arredada a possibilidade de uma evolução má aí contaminar de modo irreparável a situação económica de toda a Europa, inclusivé a da Zona Euro - esta crise, tem-o demonstrado sobejas vezes, tem potencial para nos surpreender com novos episódios desagradáveis.







Em que pé estão as coisas? Estas notas descrevem o que se passa - particularmente a segunda. Um exercício interessante é o de reflectir sobre o que esta situação nos diz sobre a situação da economia portuguesa - aliás, no excerto da último artigo, há uma menção explícita ao caso, ao "exemplo" português.






  1. Eastern Europe: Drying-Up Of Capital Inflows = Sharp Adjustment In External Imbalances - RGE Monitor's Newsletter






    "With the capital inflows to the CEE economies slowing to a trickle in Eastern Europe, a sharp correction is now underway in these countries' external imbalances (e.g. current-account deficits) For the CEE-6 (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey), net private capital flows to slow to $59.5 billion in 2009, down from an estimated $161.9 billion in 2008, according to the IIF.






    The concern is that those countries with significant deficits are extremely vulnerable to foreign capital reversals, especially in the current environment of global credit tightening FDI flows (generally considered more stable and less susceptible to rapid outflows than other capital flows) have been the main form of financing for current-account deficits in recent years, but such inflows are set to slow in 2009 [...] Economist: In 2003-07, on average, FDI inflows covered almost 100% of the current-account deficit in the region's ten EU member states. In 2008, this coverage worryingly fell to an estimated 55%."



  2. The Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) region is the sick man of emerging markets - RGE Monitor's Newsletter






    "While the global crisis means few, if any, bright spots worldwide, the situation in the CEE area is particularly bleak. After almost a decade of outpacing worldwide growth, the region looks set to contract in 2009, with almost every country either in or on the verge of recession. The once high-flying Baltics (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) look headed for double-digit contractions, while countries relatively less affected by the crisis (i.e. Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia) will have a hard time posting even positive growth.





    Meanwhile, Hungary and Latvia’s economies already deteriorated to the point where IMF help was needed late last year. The CEE’s ill health is primarily driven by two factors – collapsing exports and the drying-up of capital inflows. Exports were key to the region's economic success, accounting for a significant 80-90% of GDP [?] in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. By far the biggest market for CEE goods is the Eurozone, which is now in recession. Meanwhile, the global credit crunch has dried up capital inflows to the region. An easy flow of credit fueled Eastern Europe’s boom in recent years, but the good times are gone. According to the Institute of International Finance, net private capital flows to Emerging Europe are projected to fall from an estimated $254 billion in 2008 to $30 billion in 2009. Whether or not this is formally considered a ‘sudden stop’ of capital, it will necessitate a very painful adjustment process.





    Classic Emerging Markets Crisis In The Works?





    What is especially worrisome is that the days of easy credit flows were accompanied by rising external imbalances that rival or even exceed the build-up of imbalances in pre-crisis Asia – e.g. current account deficits in Southeast Asia from 1995-97 fell within the 3.0-8.5% of GDP range, while those in CEE were in the double-digits in Romania, Bulgaria and the Baltics in 2008. As examined in a recent RGE analysis piece, the vulnerabilities in many CEE countries – high foreign currency borrowing, hefty levels of external debt and massive current-account deficits – suggest the classic makings of a capital account crisis a la Asia in the late 1990s.





    Spillover Effects To Rest Of World







    Like the Asia crisis of 1997-98, a regional crisis in Eastern Europe would have far-reaching effects. As Harvard professor Kenneth Rogoff noted in a recent New York Times article: “There’s a domino effect. International credit markets are linked, and so a snowballing credit crisis in Eastern Europe and the Baltic countries could cause New York municipal bonds to fall.”







    Western Europe looks set to be particularly impacted via its strong trade and financial linkages. Of particular concern is the strong presence of Western European banks (via subsidiaries) in the CEE, where they hold 60-90% market share depending on the country, which paves the way for contagion. So is this the making of a cross-border banking crisis? It could be.







    Given the sharp contraction in Eastern Europe’s economies, combined with high foreign currency-denominated lending (particularly in Croatia, Hungary and Romania), weakening currencies and heavy reliance on non-deposit external financing, Eastern Europe’s banks will likely see a large spike in non-performing loans. Banking systems in the region are likely only as strong as their weakest link – or in this case, weakest country. That’s because of the ‘common lender’ phenomenon. As many CEE countries share foreign parent bank(s) in common, this paves the way for problems in just one of these countries to have ripple effects into other CEE countries.







    So even a relatively healthy economy/banking system like the Czech Republic’s – with a reasonable loan-to-deposit ratio and scant fx-denominated lending to households – is still vulnerable. Austria is far and away the Western European country most heavily exposed to the CEE region (via Austrian-based banks like Raiffeisen and Erste Bank). These banks’ collective exposure to the region amounts to over 70% of Austria’s GDP. Notably, however, other Western European countries’ total exposure is far less. Belgium and Sweden are the next in line after Austria; their lenders’ total exposure to the region amounts to a still significant 20-25% of GDP. Some fear that parent banks, if they get into trouble, could either fire-sell subsidiaries or simply walk away. Another concern is Europe’s fragmented regulatory system, which means that if a cross-border bank needs to be unwound, the process is likely to be extremely messy.





    Policymakers In Virtual Straitjackets





    CEE policymakers have fairly limited tools to cope with the crisis. Fiscal policy is constrained by the fact that belt-tightening is required to restore order to the balance of payments in some countries (i.e. Hungary, Romania, Ukraine, and the Baltics), while euro adoption ambitions limit the fiscal response in others (i.e. Poland). Meanwhile, monetary policy easing is constrained in countries with heavy foreign currency-denominated lending, like Hungary and Romania, where a weakening of the local currency could potentially trigger defaults, thereby impacting financial stability. In others (i.e. Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), monetary policy is not an available tool due to fixed exchange rates. Due to limited fiscal and monetary policy options, other CEE countries might need to follow in the footsteps of Latvia and Hungary and call on IMF help.





    In a nod to the difficult situation of many CEE countries, EU leaders called last week for IMF resources to be doubled to $500 billion to help head off new problems in crisis-hit countries. It remains to be seen, however, whether IMF help will be enough to return financial stability to the region.





    In a recent research report, economists from Danske Bank point to the increasing concern of spill-back from problems in Eastern Europe to the Eurozone. Polish authorities and commentators, such as Wolfgang Munchau, recently made the point that East European countries should be given a shortcut to join the euro and access to its safety and stability net. However, current problems faced by some EMU members show that EMU membership alone is no panacea. Moreover, previous experience shows that currency pegs can be double-edged swords that often end in capitulation. The current test case for the entire region is Latvia, whose currency peg looks increasingly fragile even after its IMF-led EUR 7.5 billion bailout package. Devaluation with its ripple effects through the region would be devastating for the mostly foreign-owned banks in the region. Unlike EMU member countries, EU countries that have not yet adopted the euro have access to the 'medium-term financial assistance' facility worth EUR 25 billion, of which EUR 10 billion in loans have already been extended to Latvia and Hungary. Additional assistance to the region will have to come from a revamped IMF, as noted before and the EBRD is also providing funds to banks in the region. Despite a 20% funding boost, however, its resources are much smaller.







    Spotlight On Ukraine





    European banks are also exposed to vulnerable economies outside of the EU. Russia is the second largest borrower from EU banks and it has over $100 billion of debt that must be financed this year. However, it is the Ukraine that may pose the biggest contagion risk, particularly if the next tranche of IMF funding continues to be deferred. Austrian, French, Swedish, Italian and German banks have a collective exposure of around EUR 30 billion to the Ukraine. Ukraine has $46 billion in foreign debt obligations falling due in 2009 and the swift plunge of the Hyrvnia has boosted the cost of servicing these debts even as corporate debts are on the rise. Ukraine’s political divisions and economic contraction of at least 6% suggest further sovereign and corporate ratings downgrades are on the way. Ukraine may thus be forced to make the budget cuts required by the IMF, but it is also reaching out to the U.S., Russia, China, Japan and the EU for additional funds.







    Government Collapse in Latvia: More Yet To Come?







    The series of riots that erupted in Bulgaria, Lithuania and Latvia in January, followed by Latvia’s government collapse last week, raise concerns that Eastern European countries may experience a period of deep destabilization and social strife as the economic crisis deepens and unemployment rates soar. The recent wave of popular unrest was not isolated to Eastern Europe. Ireland, Iceland, France, the UK and Greece also experienced street protests, but many Eastern European governments seem more vulnerable as they have limited policy options to address the crisis and little or no room for fiscal stimulus due to budgetary or financing constrains.





    Deeply unpopular austerity measures including slashed public wages, tax hikes and curbs on social spending will keep fanning public discontent in the Baltic states, Hungary and Romania. Dissatisfaction linked to the economic woes will be amplified in the countries where governments have been weakened by high-profile corruption and fraud scandals (Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria). The political forces most likely to benefit from public disaffection are those running on the populist platforms, which could disrupt efforts to battle the effects of the economic crisis. Latvia could be a case in point, as there are growing concerns that the coming election campaign might suspend the fiscal austerity measures required by the IMF bail-out package. Two other political hotspots that are at risk of early elections are Romania and Estonia, while Bulgarian national elections are due in mid-2009.





    EU’s Free Market Rules Under Pressure: Eastern Disillusionment and Western Protectionism





    Overall, a big rise in support for populist and radical parties in the region could put social, structural and environmental reforms on hold in the region and could even call into question the economic and political model Eastern European countries have followed since the 1990s. The eastern EU member states’ decisions to open their markets and move toward greater integration with the EU are now being second-guessed by some. Moreover, the protectionist measures implemented in some western EU states in support of their automotive and financial sectors are threatening the EU’s single market rules and could particularly hurt Eastern European economies. Meanwhile, a backlash over immigrant labor is likely. With the 2009 unemployment rate set to rise to 8.75% in the EU27, according to the European Commission, member states are tempted to interpret the laws in a way more favorable to their nationals. This suggests that migration trends will reverse and the eastward flow of remittances will dwindle. The return of Eastern European migrant workers, in turn, may add to social discontent in their countries of origin.





    Growing East/West Divide in the EU?





    The financial crisis has exacerbated the East/West divide within the EU illustrated by the persistent bickering between the Czech Republic, the current holder of the EU presidency and France over trade and protectionist bail out packages that hurt automotive industries in Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. So far, the EU has helped economically troubled Latvia, Poland and Hungary with swap lines and loans and called for the resources of the IMF to double in order to help the countries facing the crisis. Yet, there have been a growing number of calls for EU-led coordinated support to the Eastern European economies (recently echoed by the World Bank). If there is a perceived lack of help, the financial crisis could deepen the divide between so called “Old Europe” and “New Europe” and bring structural changes to the political landscape in Eastern Europe, such as strengthening the nationalist, euro-skeptic voices in Central Europe (Czech Republic, Poland) and the pro-Russian parties in the Baltic states.



  3. FT.com / Brussels - Eastern Europe 1






    [...] The world is far more vulnerable to a full-blown crisis in central and eastern Europe today. Top of the list is Europe, tied to the region through its banks. Defaults on euro or Swiss franc loans taken on by Hungarian or Polish borrowers are certain to rise as the forint and zloty plummet. The crucial question is how fast.


    Then there are broader economic effects. Exports to the region will fall, hurting Germany in particular. However, all western European manufacturers will suffer the heightened competition of lower-priced eastern exporters. The euro’s recent strength will only heighten this deflationary squeeze. It is no accident that European countries that can devalue – such as Sweden and the UK – already have. [...]



  4. FT.com / Brussels - Eastern Europe 2


    "For a decade, central and eastern Europe sucked in western money. Rapid growth in consumption-starved countries meant western banks deployed ample liquidity and made handsome returns. In 2005-08 alone, their exposure to “emerging” Europe, including Turkey, tripled to $1,500bn – about 40 per cent of the region’s gross domestic product. [...]

  5. The crisis in Eastern Europe: What is to be done? vox - Research-based policy analysis and commentary from leading economists

    Eastern European countries have high external imbalances that constrain their policy responses to the crisis. This column says the EU should provide support through both fiscal and financial measures. [...] The current crisis within the financial sector that is spilling over into the real sector is difficult to tackle because of the duality between common market policies and national structure of governance. One indication of this problem is the limited responsibilities of the Brussels’ budget; another is the limited reach of the ECB in the domain of financial sector supervision. [...] Other complications are connected with the slow process of euro enlargement, which has ramifications both for the euro zone and for the EU member states (as well as some non-member states) outside of that zone. [...]

    [...] In the medium run, there is a difference between countries that can devalue and countries that will try to deflate (for which there are limited possibilities in the current global climate of inflation rates close to zero). Recovery is stronger after devaluation, while deflation can drag on well past the medium run. This seems to be the lesson from the deflationary adjustments in some euro member states, e.g., Portugal. In the time of crisis, countries within the euro area are sheltered due to unacceptably high cost to leaving the euro. Their sovereign bonds are better rated and flow of credit suffers less. In the medium run, however, return to higher growth rates tends to be more difficult. [...]









Li e recomendo

Li hoje no Económico (ex-Diário Económico) estes artigos, e recomendo a sua leitura:






  • Autoritarismo de vão-de-escada Económico (Pedro Adão e Silva)
    "[...] enquanto se democratizaram as relações de poder ao nível macro, em Portugal há uma espécie de autoritarismo de vão-de-escada, baseado em micropoderes que beneficiam do lastro de autoritarismo que persiste na sociedade portuguesa. Na verdade, não é necessário incitamento activo vindo de cima (leia-se, do poder político), para que nas mais diversas esferas se assista ao exercício de autoridade com escassa cultura democrática. Há uma rede de micropoderes, que se encontra difundida na nossa sociedade e que não nasce necessariamente do centro. Além do mais, em democracia, o autoritarismo é como o tango, precisa de pelo menos dois para existir. Ou seja, o exercício autoritário do poder requer que uma das partes exerça um constrangimento activo, mas necessita também que haja uma predisposição social e individual para aceitá-lo. [...]"

  • A dívida que nos une Económico
    "[...] Ora o que inevitavelmente nos une é uma enorme dívida. E não se pense que é só o Estado que está endividado com uma dívida pública que dificilmente não ultrapassará em 2009 a fasquia dos 70% do PIB. Além do Estado estão endividadas as empresas que em 2007 deviam 114% do PIB e estão endividadas as famílias, que no final do mesmo ano deviam 129% do rendimento disponível, (91% do PIB) ocupando os três tipo de devedores sempre um dos três primeiros lugares da zona euro. E não se pense, nem se diga que esta dívida foi desperdício e superficialidade. [...]
    E naturalmente face a este acréscimo de dívida tivemos que recorrer ao estrangeiro para nos endividarmos. Assim, a nossa dívida externa deverá ser hoje mais de 150 mil milhões de euros quando dez anos antes se situava em cerca de 27 mil milhões de euros, isto é cinco vezes mais. É por isso que nos próximos anos a poupança será uma prioridade inevitável. [...]
    Mas se a dívida nos une, é fundamental consciencializarmo-nos que teremos não só de pagar os juros como, a prazo, reduzir esta dependência, isto é, pagar esta dívida. Para isso temos de nos concentrar em tornar a dívida produtiva, isto é garantir ganhos reais de produtividade. Só que quando olhamos para a nossa produtividade verificamos que o nosso crescimento nos últimos 10 anos se fica pelos 1,6% média ano, valor inferior à média europeia o que coloca Portugal em 16º lugar no ‘ranking' do PIB/per capita na Europa dos 27 e com clara tendência de perda de posições.
    É por isso que, se a dívida nos une, terá que ser a produtividade (e a competitividade) que nos deverá unir."

23 de março de 2009

Infraestruturas

Existe um grande clamor contra os grandes projectos de infraestruturação que este Governo quer levar à frente: TGV, auto-estradas, barragens. Algumas dessas vozes merecem-me todo o respeito, quer do ponto de vista técnico, quer do ponto de vista de honorabilidade pessoal. O seu argumento principal assenta no possibilidade do nível e taxa de progressão do nosso endividamento externo se vir a tornar insustentável pelo que aqueles grandes projectos, (alguns de rendibilidade económica duvidosa - alegam), iriam potenciar ainda mais essa possibilidade. É uma argumentação que cala fundo. E por tudo isso "mon coeur balance...".







Onde está a minha hesitação?













Para já reside na diferença entre os projectos: por exemplo, as barragens têm uma bondade estratégica diferente das auto-estradas - Manuela Ferreira Leite fragilizou a sua posição por não ter descriminado entre os projectos, e os ter atacado na totalidade.













(As auto-estradas não convencem-me muito e, da mesma forma, o TGV Lisboa-Porto.)













Depois, resulta do facto de não saber se na apreciação negativa que se faz, por exemplo, do TGV Lisboa-Madrid, se está a dar a devida consideração aos denominados efeitos dinâmicos da oferta - a procura existente não seria suficiente efectivamente para assegurar a rendibilidade da ligação TGV, Lisboa-Madrid, mas a nova oferta, o TGV, poderia criar uma procura muito maior do que a existente, com todos os benefícios daí decorrentes. E o mesmo quanto ao ganho na não-emissão de gases de estufa (relativamente às alternativas do transporte aéreo e rodoviário) e à maior eficiência no uso dos combustíveis fósseis. (No que respeita a estes dois últimos aspectos, o seu custo económico irá crescer de modo sustentado nos próximos anos - disso não tenho dúvidas).













(Será que estes resultados se poderão obter com uma possibilidade de transporte ferroviário de alta velocidade que não o TGV? Campos e Cunha deu-o a entender na conferência que fez em Ponta Delgada - ver aqui.)













Por isso, eu gostaria mesmo era de ter resposta a estas perguntas:



















  1. Cada um destes projectos justifica-se em termos duma análise custo-benefício que integre todos os aspectos (*) ?












  2. Admitindo que a bondade de um dado projecto X seja validada por aquela análise custo- benefício, será que o custo de oportunidade do agravamento do endividamento externo nele implicado é de tal monta que deva impossibilitar a sua concretização?












  3. Ou, em alternativa, a bondade do projecto é de tal monta, que não haveria remédio se não concretizá-lo com o custo de oportunidade em termos de agravamento do endividamento externo (que não pode nem deve ser ignorado) a ter de ser compensado noutros domínios e de outro modo?






Naturalmente, em tudo isto, não se pode esquecer o quadro onde os políticos e os Governos se movem, e este não é susceptível de ser reconduzido à estrita racionalidade (quando bem feitas) das análises custo-benefício: há que gerir interesses, expectativas, incentivos, compromissos. Veja-se, por exemplo, Manuela Ferreira Leite questionada sobre a auto-estrada de ligação a Trás-os-Montes, a afirmar que, quanto a essa, estava de acordo (neste quadro de condicionalismos, cheira-me que essa seria uma infraestura que poderia ser adiada - mas, como é óbvio, não sou dos Trás-os-Montes). Daí a importância de consagrar regras de actuação que assegurem maior transparência, maior liberdade de actuação dos próprios políticos face àquele quadro de condicionalismos - os grandes projectos (há muita gente a defendê-lo) deveriam ser sustentados na sua escolha à elaboração de livros brancos feitos por comissões independentes e tecnicamente qualificadas e sujeitos à discussão pública.







(Li isto, ou ouvi, já não sei onde: um ex-comissário europeu contava que, por vezes, era instado por políticos nacionais a não viabilizar projectos que os próprios se tinham comprometido fazer perante os seus eleitores por não acreditarem na sua bondade).

(Já tinha escrito sobre este assunto: ver aqui, aqui, e aqui.)

As referências que se seguem foram sendo recolhidas ao longo do tempo (não sei se estão ordenadas pela data da sua publicação):

  • Spain's high-speed revolution Ave Madrid The Economist
    "The opening of the Barcelona-Madrid line a year ago marked the beginning of the end of airlines’ dominance. In its first ten months it carried 2m passengers; in 2008 its share of the total market rose from 28% to 38%. Josep Valls, of the ESADE business school, predicts that trains will carry most long-distance travellers within two years."
  • Jornal de Negócios Online Apanhar o Comboio

    "O custo da infra-estrutura é indiscutivelmente elevado, mas os retornos são igualmente muito elevados. Quando foi feita a primeira ligação da Alta Velocidade Espanhola, entre Madrid e Sevilha, muitos acharam que a escolha se deveu ao facto de esta ser a cidade natal do primeiro-ministro espanhol da época e vaticinaram resultados económicos desastrosos. Pelo contrário, o tráfego excedeu todas as expectativas e a viabilidade económica do novo corredor foi mesmo decisiva para a recuperação financeira dos défices crónicos da RENFE espanhola. A ligação em TGV entre Lisboa e Madrid não vai apenas canalizar para o comboio a maioria dos passageiros que actualmente utilizam o avião. Vai também retirar milhares de automóveis das estradas e reforçar decisivamente a nossa ligação à Europa, romper isolamentos e permitir o crescimento da actividade económica. A economia em emissões de dióxido de carbono, ignorada na maioria das avaliações, é um factor adicional a reforçar o imperativo desta decisão. "


  • outubro» Arquivo » Novas redes, nova esquerda

    "A propósito daquela que foi apelidada da primeira medida do Governo contra a crise - o acordo sobre as redes de nova geração - é interessante rememorar algumas ideias feitas, factos políticos e outras quimeras sobre a relação entre a tecnologia e as políticas de esquerda. O potencial revolucionário das redes de nova geração é tal que qualquer pessoa que se diga de esquerda não pode deixar de sorrir perante as suas possibilidades."

  • outubro» Arquivo » Lá por fora, o TGV:

    "Em artigo publicado na Prospect com o título “All change”, Andrew Adonis, ministro dos transportes do Reino Unido, defende que a renovação das principais vias ferroviárias do país deve implicar a adopção da alta velocidade. Esta opção, argumenta, venceu já não só em boa parte da Europa ocidental mas também no Japão e, mais recentemente, nos EUA. A este propósito recorda, aliás, que no dia da eleição de Obama os californianos votaram a favor da proposta do governador Schwarzenegger de construir uma linha de alta velocidade entre São Francisco e Los Angeles."

  • 2009 - DiarioEconomico.com

  • Sahara - DiarioEconomico.com

    "Neste tipo de conjuntura a tentação em gastar biliões em “grandes projectos para relançar a economia” é sempre grande. Contudo, a experiência tem mostrado que o seu efeito sobre a actividade económica é efémero e, frequentemente, não reprodutivo.

    Para além dos benefícios directos às construtoras do regime, poucos impactos indirectos advirão numa economia onde a secura do crédito trava os efeitos multiplicadores antecipados por quem de macroeconomia pouco entende."



__________________

(*) por definição, é o que qualquer análise custo-benefício deve fazer, mas quero enfatizar os aspectos que referi acima