The rise of American authoritarianism
agora, sobre as atribulações de um independente de esquerda nestes tempos da III República ...
9 de março de 2016
A discussão sobre as razões do sucesso de Trump, ainda estão no adro
The rise of American authoritarianism
2 de outubro de 2011
Isto é impressionante; tem lições de aplicação mais geral, nomeadamente, para nós, cidadãos portugueses; tem informação politicamente incorrecta e é algo incontornável para perceber o que se está a passar nos EUA ...
[....] His view of his seven years trying to run the state of California can be summarized as follows. He [Arnold Schwarzenegger] came to power accidentally, but not without ideas about what he wanted to do. At his core he thought government had become more problem than solution: an institution run less for the benefit of the people than for the benefit of politicians and other public employees. He behaved pretty much as Americans seem to imagine the ideal politician should behave: he made bold decisions without looking at polls; he didn’t sell favors; he treated his opponents fairly; he was quick to acknowledge his mistakes and to learn from them; and so on. He was the rare elected official who believed, with some reason, that he had nothing to lose, and behaved accordingly. When presented with the chance to pursue an agenda that violated his own narrow political self-interest for the sake of the public interest, he tended to leap at it. “There were a lot of times when we said, ‘You just can’t do that,’ ” says his former chief of staff, Susan Kennedy, a lifelong Democrat, whose hiring was one of those things a Republican governor was not supposed to do. “He was always like, ‘I don’t care.’ Ninety percent of the time it was a good thing.”
T wo years into his tenure, in mid-2005, he’d tried everything he could think of to persuade individual California state legislators to vote against the short-term desires of their constituents for the greater long-term good of all. “To me there were shocking moments,” he says. Having sped past a do not enter sign, we are now flying through intersections without pausing. I can’t help but notice that, if we weren’t breaking the law by going the wrong way down a one-way street, we’d be breaking the law by running stop signs. “When you want to do pension reform for the prison guards,” he says, “and all of a sudden the Republicans are all lined up against you. It was really incredible, and it happened over and over: people would say to me, ‘Yes, this is the best idea! I would love to vote for it! But if I vote for it some interest group is going to be angry with me, so I won’t do it.’ I couldn’t believe people could actually say that. You have soldiers dying in Iraq and Afghanistan, and they didn’t want to risk their political lives by doing the right thing.”
[....]I notice on his shelf a copy of Fortune magazine, with Meredith Whitney on the cover. And as he talked about the bankrupting of Vallejo, I realized that I had heard this story before, or a private-sector version of it. The people who had power in the society, and were charged with saving it from itself, had instead bled the society to death. The problem with police officers and firefighters isn’t a public-sector problem; it isn’t a problem with government; it’s a problem with the entire society. It’s what happened on Wall Street in the run-up to the subprime crisis. It’s a problem of people taking what they can, just because they can, without regard to the larger social consequences. It’s not just a coincidence that the debts of cities and states spun out of control at the same time as the debts of individual Americans. Alone in a dark room with a pile of money, Americans knew exactly what they wanted to do, from the top of the society to the bottom. They’d been conditioned to grab as much as they could, without thinking about the long-term consequences. Afterward, the people on Wall Street would privately bemoan the low morals of the American people who walked away from their subprime loans, and the American people would express outrage at the Wall Street people who paid themselves a fortune to design the bad loans.
15 de agosto de 2011
Depoimento magnífico - este tipo é um conservador inglês e eu sou de esquerda, mas estou de acordo com aquilo que diz, nomeadamente, em relação ao que diz sobre a educação liberal - sejamos cautelosos, no entanto, com a extensão do acordo: pelo menos como base de partida de uma análise mais profunda, já que fica muito para explicar
A while ago two of my students said they were going to 'turn over' a large house in a wealthy area near them. I asked why? They said they had it tough, they wanted a new TV, and it was something to do.I listened, and then explained that just because they were poor they didn't need to rob a house. I told them that I didn't even have a TV, which amazed them. I explained to them how my Grandparents grew up in the East End during the great depression. There were few jobs, no money and no welfare. They went without food on occasion, suffered discrimination and had to deal with fascism, yet they emerged from poverty. I explained how they did it: They worked hard, sacrificed for the future, educated themselves, showed respect for the law and other people, had strong families and never gave up. The two boys looked thoughtful for a while and then one said: 'Yes, but I never had a father to tell me that'.
19 de abril de 2011
Apatia e participação
9 de março de 2011
"Não há almoços grátis"
"[....] a prática que existia no século XIX em muitos bares norte-americanos, e também nalguns ingleses, de oferecer a comida (‘free lunch') aos clientes que comprassem pelo menos uma bebida. O almoço era grátis, apenas era necessário pagar as bebidas. Aparentemente, a comida não importava. Obviamente que nos locais onde havia esta prática comercial as bebidas eram mais caras do que naqueles onde não havia 'almoços grátis'.Na primeira metade do século passado, o acrónimo ‘tinstaafl' (‘there is no such thing as a free lunch') começou a ser popularizado, explicitando a ideia que mesmo que alguma coisa pareça grátis existe sempre um custo a pagar por alguém. O custo pode ser indirecto ou não ser imediatamente evidente, mas existe. Em muitas áreas, ‘tinstaafl' procura evidenciar o custo de oportunidade ao tomar-se uma decisão. Se uma pessoa ou grupo beneficia de algum bem ou serviço de graça, seguramente haverá alguém a pagar por esse benefício.Em Portugal, o acrónimo tem sido pouco divulgado. E não se tem querido entender a ideia subjacente. A rede de estradas que temos; os estádios de futebol construídos; a quantidade de serviços públicos e empresas públicas que existem sem uma justificação clara; a facilidade com que o Estado (essa entidade mítica) proporciona uma casa grátis, ensino universitário (tendencialmente) grátis, prestação de cuidados de saúde grátis, acessos viários grátis, etc., são exemplos [continuar a ler ...] .
21 de fevereiro de 2010
Nota de leitura
10 de fevereiro de 2010
6 de fevereiro de 2010
Razões para o excepcionalismo dos EUA, no que respeita ao modo como os seus cidadãos percepcionam a segurança social, a produção de bens públicos, e a esquerda
- Economist's View: Birds of a Feather and Bad Economic Weather: "Spending on social programs tends to fall as racial and ethnic diversity increases: [...] Many Americans are skeptical about government spending on social programs, and they cite a litany of familiar reasons: big government programs aren’t effective, they are vulnerable to waste and abuse, and they run counter to the libertarian, self-reliant spirit of the nation’s founders. But a growing body of research suggests that America’s antipathy toward big government has another, less-often-acknowledged underpinning: the nation’s racial and ethnic diversity. Recent studies ... have found that this mix tends to undermine support for government spending on “public goods” of all types, whether health care, roads or welfare programs for the disadvantaged. ... “Racial divisions and ethnic divisions reduce incentives for people to be generous to others through social welfare,” said Alberto Alesina, a professor of economics at Harvard. “This is very unfortunate. But as social scientists, we can’t close our eyes to something we don’t like.” .."
- Economist's View: Why is the Left More Successful in Europe?: "Over decades, the success of the left in Europe and the right in the United States has led to wildly different beliefs about the nature of poverty and success. We found that 60 percent of Americans thought that the poor were lazy, while only 26 percent of European share that view. Fifty four percent of Europeans think luck determines income; only 30 percent of Americans concur. These differences don’t reflect economic reality... They instead reflect the long-run ability of politics to shape public opinion. Institutions, like proportional representation, that empower the left do a good job of explaining which nations have opinions associated with the left, like the view that chance determines success. A year ago, I wondered if the Obama victory signaled the declining significance of race and an American lurch to the left. But countries change slowly. ... By world standards, we are a conservative nation. Those who would change that fact need to dig in for a long fight."
23 de janeiro de 2010
Por favor, tomem nota! [Nota: Esta exortação deve ser lida em voz alta em tom enfastiado]
Continuar a ler em Government information: Creative commons | Comment is free | The Guardian
18 de janeiro de 2010
Porque razão uns são assim, e outros, não? Claro que tem que ver com a história, mas quais as características determinantes?
Continuar a ler em The narcissism of cynicism | The Economist
17 de novembro de 2009
Num primeiro relance, existem por cá experiências similares, mas importaria acompanhar o que os outros estão a fazer
10 de novembro de 2009
Resulta daqui, também, a importância do combate à corrupção
As Amartya Sen observes in "Rational Fools" (link), "The purely economic man is indeed close to being a social moron." [...] But we know that this conclusion does a bad job of describing real social life. People in villages, communities, political parties, religious organizations, public television audiences, and ethnic groups do in fact often succeed in getting themselves organized and mobilized in pursuit of a public good for the group.
If fairness or conditional altruism are real components of human agency (for all or many human beings), then we can identify a few factors that are likely to increase the likelihood of cooperation and collective action. Measures that increase the actor's assurance of the behavior of others will have the effect of eliciting higher levels of collective action. And it is possible to think of quite a few social circumstances that have this effect. A shared history of success in collective action is clearly relevant to current actors' level of assurance about future cooperation.
Via Economist's View: "Conditional Altruists"
2 de novembro de 2009
O que os outros vão fazendo, e mais um exemplo de um pequeno empurrão ("nudge")
"[...] In 2007, Cialdini and colleagues conducted an experiment that involved placing one of four door hangers on the doors of participants once a week for a month. The door hangers informed residents that (1) they could save money by conserving energy, or (2) they could save the earth’s resources by conserving energy, or (3) they could be socially responsible citizens by conserving energy, or (4) the majority of their neighbors tried regularly to conserve energy. Although residents reported that they would be least influenced by their neighbors’ energy usage, this was the only type of door hanger information that led to significant efforts to conserve energy.[...]"
10 de outubro de 2009
"Nudge"
Tirado de The Monkey Cage: How do you get people to walk up the stairs instead of taking the escalator?
2 de outubro de 2009
O Paradoxo Europeu
"Looking across Europe and the United States, progressives have two strengths going for them. The first is that modernizing demographic forces are shifting the political terrain in their favor. Consider these trends:
The rise of a progressive younger generation
The increase in immigrant/minority populations
The continuing rise in educational levels
The growth of the professional class
The increasing social weight of single and alternative households and growing religious diversity and secularism.
All these factors favor the broad center-left of the political spectrum in America (the Democratic Party) and in Europe (the social democrats, the greens, the far left and liberal centrists). Put simply, progressives are the natural beneficiaries of modernity and that, combined with their still substantial base among the working class, puts them in a potentially dominating political position.
Progressives’ second big advantage is the intellectual and policy bankruptcy of conservatism. Their approach to the problems afflicting today’s complex global capitalism still relies heavily on laissez-faire and is completely devoid of creative ideas for taming the immense power of this economic system for the common good. The assumption that capitalism left to its own devices is both self-regulating and productive of the best economic outcomes would be laughable at this point if the actual outcomes had not been so tragic."
15 de agosto de 2009
....
"... é assim que o mundo acaba - não com uma explosão, mas com uma lamúria".
24 de julho de 2009
Elites e democracia
13 de junho de 2009
Aquilo que podemos fazer interessa sempre
"Nobody made a greater mistake than he who did nothing because he could do only a little." - Edmund Burke- citado em RealClimate
23 de abril de 2009
25 de março de 2009
Enquanto isso, na Europa ...
- .... Se Wolfgang Munchau, muito céptico sobre a solução norte-americana, discute o que se deve fazer na Europa, em FT.com / Columnists / Wolfgang Munchau - Europe needs a better plan for its banks, o "A Fistful of Euros" defende que, na Europa, teremos de ir, possivelmente, para a nacionalização de países: Krugman Says Nationalise The (Bad) Banks, And I Say Nationalise The (Bad) Countries afoe A Fistful of Euros European Opinion (muito interessante - nós o que necessitamos é de um outro Pacto de Estabilidade e Crescimento mais rigoroso - é defendido!).
... As previsões sobre a situação económica alemã são revistas (ainda mais) em baixa German 2009 GDP Forecasts Getting Revised Down afoe A Fistful of Euros European Opinion
"Well, following the OECD forecast last week (German GDP to drop 5.1 percent 2009, compared to a decline of 4.1 percent in the euro region), German bank analysts and research institutes are now cutting their forecasts. Perhaps the most radical at this point is Joerg Kraemer, chief economist at Commerzbank in Frankfurt, who is predicting German gross domestic product will drop as much as 7 percent in 2009. He was previously forecasting a drop of between 3 percent and 4 percent. The institutes are also coming into line, and RWI institute have now said they expect the economy to shrink 4.3 percent instead of the 2 percent projected in December, while the IMK institute has cut its forecast to a contraction of 5 percent from an earlier1.8 percent one."
... a Presidência Checa demonstra inequivocamente a necessidade que temos (pelo menos) do Tratado de Lisboa: Paging Vaclav Klaus afoe A Fistful of Euros European Opinion e FT.com Brussels Blog Knives are out for a tottering Czech EU presidency. Eu já o tinha dito (ver aqui).
PS: Aproveito para referenciar um artigo interessante de Pedro Magalhães sobre as temáticas das próximas eleições europeias: Outras Margens: A Europa possível. A comentar, eventualmente, um dia destes.
PS (2009.03.26): E este Timothy Garton Ash: The G20 summit in London will be missing one great power. Europe Comment is free The Guardian