Mostrar mensagens com a etiqueta cidadãos. Mostrar todas as mensagens
Mostrar mensagens com a etiqueta cidadãos. Mostrar todas as mensagens

9 de março de 2016

A discussão sobre as razões do sucesso de Trump, ainda estão no adro

Em questões do foro sociológico não  aceito explicações mono-causais por muito significativas as possa considerar, e aquilo que é discutido neste artigo sobre o perfil psicológico dos denominados autoritários e o impacto que isso tem na política norte-americana, máxime no ascenso de Trump, é coberto por essa consideração. Agora, que há qualquer coisa nesta história, isso há.

The rise of American authoritarianism

2 de outubro de 2011

Isto é impressionante; tem lições de aplicação mais geral, nomeadamente, para nós, cidadãos portugueses; tem informação politicamente incorrecta e é algo incontornável para perceber o que se está a passar nos EUA ...

É de leitura obrigatória e na sua totalidade. São transcritas duas pequenas partes do artigo - ele é extenso. O bold é meu:


[....] His view of his seven years trying to run the state of California can be summarized as follows. He [Arnold Schwarzeneggercame to power accidentally, but not without ideas about what he wanted to do. At his core he thought government had become more problem than solution: an institution run less for the benefit of the people than for the benefit of politicians and other public employees. He behaved pretty much as Americans seem to imagine the ideal politician should behave: he made bold decisions without looking at polls; he didn’t sell favors; he treated his opponents fairly; he was quick to acknowledge his mistakes and to learn from them; and so on. He was the rare elected official who believed, with some reason, that he had nothing to lose, and behaved accordingly. When presented with the chance to pursue an agenda that violated his own narrow political self-interest for the sake of the public interest, he tended to leap at it. “There were a lot of times when we said, ‘You just can’t do that,’ ” says his former chief of staff, Susan Kennedy, a lifelong Democrat, whose hiring was one of those things a Republican governor was not supposed to do. “He was always like, ‘I don’t care.’ Ninety percent of the time it was a good thing.”

T wo years into his tenure, in mid-2005, he’d tried everything he could think of to persuade individual California state legislators to vote against the short-term desires of their constituents for the greater long-term good of all. “To me there were shocking moments,” he says. Having sped past a do not enter sign, we are now flying through intersections without pausing. I can’t help but notice that, if we weren’t breaking the law by going the wrong way down a one-way street, we’d be breaking the law by running stop signs. “When you want to do pension reform for the prison guards,” he says, “and all of a sudden the Republicans are all lined up against you. It was really incredible, and it happened over and over: people would say to me, ‘Yes, this is the best idea! I would love to vote for it! But if I vote for it some interest group is going to be angry with me, so I won’t do it.’ I couldn’t believe people could actually say that. You have soldiers dying in Iraq and Afghanistan, and they didn’t want to risk their political lives by doing the right thing.”
[....]I notice on his shelf a copy of Fortune magazine, with Meredith Whitney on the cover. And as he talked about the bankrupting of Vallejo, I realized that I had heard this story before, or a private-sector version of it. The people who had power in the society, and were charged with saving it from itself, had instead bled the society to death. The problem with police officers and firefighters isn’t a public-sector problem; it isn’t a problem with government; it’s a problem with the entire society. It’s what happened on Wall Street in the run-up to the subprime crisis. It’s a problem of people taking what they can, just because they can, without regard to the larger social consequences. It’s not just a coincidence that the debts of cities and states spun out of control at the same time as the debts of individual Americans. Alone in a dark room with a pile of money, Americans knew exactly what they wanted to do, from the top of the society to the bottom. They’d been conditioned to grab as much as they could, without thinking about the long-term consequences. Afterward, the people on Wall Street would privately bemoan the low morals of the American people who walked away from their subprime loans, and the American people would express outrage at the Wall Street people who paid themselves a fortune to design the bad loans.


15 de agosto de 2011

Depoimento magnífico - este tipo é um conservador inglês e eu sou de esquerda, mas estou de acordo com aquilo que diz, nomeadamente, em relação ao que diz sobre a educação liberal - sejamos cautelosos, no entanto, com a extensão do acordo: pelo menos como base de partida de uma análise mais profunda, já que fica muito para explicar


A while ago two of my students said they were going to 'turn over' a large house in a wealthy area near them. I asked why? They said they had it tough, they wanted a new TV, and it was something to do.

I listened, and then explained that just because they were poor they didn't need to rob a house. I told them that I didn't even have a TV, which amazed them. I explained to them how my Grandparents grew up in the East End during the great depression. There were few jobs, no money and no welfare. They went without food on occasion, suffered discrimination and had to deal with fascism, yet they emerged from poverty. I explained how they did it: They worked hard, sacrificed for the future, educated themselves, showed respect for the law and other people, had strong families and never gave up. The two boys looked thoughtful for a while and then one said: 'Yes, but I never had a father to tell me that'.

19 de abril de 2011

Apatia e participação



"About this talk

Local politics -- schools, zoning, council elections -- hit us where we live. So why don't more of us actually get involved? Is it apathy? Dave Meslin says no. He identifies 7 barriers that keep us from taking part in our communities, even when we truly care."

Vejam: tem a ver com o que se passa. Não é tudo, mas é uma parte.

9 de março de 2011

"Não há almoços grátis"


"[....] a prática que existia no século XIX em muitos bares norte-americanos, e também nalguns ingleses, de oferecer a comida (‘free lunch') aos clientes que comprassem pelo menos uma bebida. O almoço era grátis, apenas era necessário pagar as bebidas. Aparentemente, a comida não importava. Obviamente que nos locais onde havia esta prática comercial as bebidas eram mais caras do que naqueles onde não havia 'almoços grátis'.

Na primeira metade do século passado, o acrónimo ‘tinstaafl' (‘there is no such thing as a free lunch') começou a ser popularizado, explicitando a ideia que mesmo que alguma coisa pareça grátis existe sempre um custo a pagar por alguém. O custo pode ser indirecto ou não ser imediatamente evidente, mas existe. Em muitas áreas, ‘tinstaafl' procura evidenciar o custo de oportunidade ao tomar-se uma decisão. Se uma pessoa ou grupo beneficia de algum bem ou serviço de graça, seguramente haverá alguém a pagar por esse benefício.

Em Portugal, o acrónimo tem sido pouco divulgado. E não se tem querido entender a ideia subjacente. A rede de estradas que temos; os estádios de futebol construídos; a quantidade de serviços públicos e empresas públicas que existem sem uma justificação clara; a facilidade com que o Estado (essa entidade mítica) proporciona uma casa grátis, ensino universitário (tendencialmente) grátis, prestação de cuidados de saúde grátis, acessos viários grátis, etc., são exemplos [continuar a ler ...] .

- Sent using Google Toolbar"

Entendamo-nos: justifica-se, nalguns casos,ou, melhor, em muitos casos, que assim possa acontecer. O que não tem justificação alguma é que nos esqueçamos que assim é, e isso, mais que não fosse, porque potencia, desculpa, viabiliza, o mau uso  de recursos escassos, logo a ineficiência, a corrupção, a preguiça na reflexão estratégica, etc., etc.

21 de fevereiro de 2010

Nota de leitura

"Uma venerável tradição da teoria política associa o acto de participar no sistema político ao desenvolvimento da lealdade à instituições. Embora um súbito acréscimo de participação possa ser desestabilizador, a oportunidade de participar e a convicção de que o envolvimento pessoal vale a pena tende a relacionar-se com a satisfação com o sistema político. Como Gabriel Almond e Sidney Verba observaram no seu clássico estudo comparativo sobre cultura política: "Aqueles que se consideram competentes para participar são igualmente os que mais tendem a acreditar que um sistema democrático participativo é o mais adequado."

A citação acima foi retirada de "Porque não houve Socialismo na América", Seymor Lipset e Gary Marks, Quetzal Editores, 2001, p.70 (Feira do Livro). Refere-se, em seguida, como exemplo do que ali é defendido,  o aumento do número dos eleitos nos EUA, no seguimento das reformas jacksonianas, na  terceira década do século XIX, mas penso que a militância partidária, quando devidamente enquadrada e incentivada, funciona como uma boa proxy dessa experiência - a experiência dos partidos sociais-democratas e comunistas, nos seus melhores tempos, comprova-o.

6 de fevereiro de 2010

Razões para o excepcionalismo dos EUA, no que respeita ao modo como os seus cidadãos percepcionam a segurança social, a produção de bens públicos, e a esquerda

Paulo Portas sabe-o!
  • Economist's View: Birds of a Feather and Bad Economic Weather: "Spending on social programs tends to fall as racial and ethnic diversity increases: [...] Many Americans are skeptical about government spending on social programs, and they cite a litany of familiar reasons: big government programs aren’t effective, they are vulnerable to waste and abuse, and they run counter to the libertarian, self-reliant spirit of the nation’s founders. But a growing body of research suggests that America’s antipathy toward big government has another, less-often-acknowledged underpinning: the nation’s racial and ethnic diversity. Recent studies ... have found that this mix tends to undermine support for government spending on “public goods” of all types, whether health care, roads or welfare programs for the disadvantaged. ... “Racial divisions and ethnic divisions reduce incentives for people to be generous to others through social welfare,” said Alberto Alesina, a professor of economics at Harvard. “This is very unfortunate. But as social scientists, we can’t close our eyes to something we don’t like.” ..
  • Economist's View: Why is the Left More Successful in Europe?: "Over decades, the success of the left in Europe and the right in the United States has led to wildly different beliefs about the nature of poverty and success. We found that 60 percent of Americans thought that the poor were lazy, while only 26 percent of European share that view. Fifty four percent of Europeans think luck determines income; only 30 percent of Americans concur. These differences don’t reflect economic reality... They instead reflect the long-run ability of politics to shape public opinion. Institutions, like proportional representation, that empower the left do a good job of explaining which nations have opinions associated with the left, like the view that chance determines success. A year ago, I wondered if the Obama victory signaled the declining significance of race and an American lurch to the left. But countries change slowly. ... By world standards, we are a conservative nation. Those who would change that fact need to dig in for a long fight."

23 de janeiro de 2010

Por favor, tomem nota! [Nota: Esta exortação deve ser lida em voz alta em tom enfastiado]

"The invention of movable type led to a paradigm shift in communication. It was the midwife of the modern world. At the time, however, it seemed merely that monks would have to find things other than copying biblical texts to do with their days. The internet has always been different. Almost from its inception, trying to gauge where the world wide web might take us has been a major preoccupation of commerce, not least the newspaper industry. 

The government, equally, has pondered how it might be used. Predictably, its first instinct was simply to use it to do what it was already doing but a bit more quickly. But this week it dramatically raised its game, with the launch of new website, data.gov.uk, which has met with a warm reception. It puts into the public domain every bit of information collected by public bodies that is not personal or sensitive, from alcohol-attributable mortality to years of life lost through TB. Happily, not all the data sets deal with death. 

Even a generation ago most of the vast amount of data collected by government was unavailable, and some of it – such as the location of the Post Office tower – was classified as an ­official secret. At the very least this amounts to agenuine ­culture change in what has always been a deeply ­conservative ­bureaucracy. At its most ­powerful, it could transform the nature of power."  

Continuar a ler em Government information: Creative commons | Comment is free | The Guardian

18 de janeiro de 2010

Porque razão uns são assim, e outros, não? Claro que tem que ver com a história, mas quais as características determinantes?

As respostas são variadas, e como estamos a falar de realidades complexas, todas terão alguma capacidade explicativa - a dificuldade está em como destrinçar o contributo relativo de cada uma. O que se diz abaixo, tem interesse, cola com aquilo que se sabe - aliás cruza com a problemática das diferenças em capital social e as consequências disso para a dotação em confiança existente em diferentes sociedades (Robert Putnam).. É óbvio que não acredito que explique tudo

"I think cynicism is often a corrosive force in Europe, especially in France and the countries of southern Europe that I know reasonably well. And I think there is a link between European cynicism and that sense of enfranchisement I found in America. Put rather harshly, bits of Europe are held back by something like the cynicism of the disenfranchised: the natural suspicion, caution and bleakness of those with no real stake in or power over their societies. Such cynicism sees the world as a zero sum game. In the past, this was pejoratively labelled 'peasant cunning'. Giuseppe di Lampedusa wrote about the 19th century Sicilian peasants who, in plain view of their home village on the very next hilltop, would deny any knowledge of its whereabouts if asked for directions by a stranger—just to be on the safe side. Today, Europe suffers from the cynicism of the tax evader who assumes that his political masters are also stealing money, so why fund them? [...]."

Continuar a ler em The narcissism of cynicism | The Economist

17 de novembro de 2009

Num primeiro relance, existem por cá experiências similares, mas importaria acompanhar o que os outros estão a fazer

Here comes the citizen co-producer | openDemocracy: "Many countries in Europe are searching for new ways to involve citizens and the third sector in the provision and governance of social services. At a general level, the reasons are similar throughout Europe. They include the challenge of an aging population, the growing democracy deficit at all levels, local, regional, national and European, and the semi-permanent austerity in public finances, prior to the recent worldwide financial melt-down. While the impact of this last is yet to be seen on public services, there is a silver lining: now may be the time for expanding the role of civil society and cooperative production of welfare services."

10 de novembro de 2009

Resulta daqui, também, a importância do combate à corrupção

"Conditional Altruists" Assurance game, by Daniel Little: How does a group of people succeed in coming together to contribute to a collective project over an extended period of time? [...]Purely self-interested egoists won't make it -- that is the message of Mancur Olson's Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods
[...]
As Amartya Sen observes in "Rational Fools" (link), "The purely economic man is indeed close to being a social moron." [...] But we know that this conclusion does a bad job of describing real social life. People in villages, communities, political parties, religious organizations, public television audiences, and ethnic groups do in fact often succeed in getting themselves organized and mobilized in pursuit of a public good for the group. 
[...] 
Many theories can be articulated in order to account for the spontaneous occurrence of collective action.  
[...] 
Many real social actors seem to be what might be called "conditional altruists": they are willing to contribute some effort or personal resource to a collective project if they have grounds for confidence that a reasonable number of other members of the group will contribute as well. (Jon Elster explores the idea in The Cement of Society: A Survey of Social Order.) 
[...] 
Conditional altruism thus attributes a common moral psychology to social actors, which we might refer to as the "fairness factor." Individuals are willing to factor collective goods into their calculation of the costs and benefits of action, and they have some degree of motivation to act in accordance with a proposed collective action that would benefit them even if they could evade participation. They are disposed to act fairly: "If I benefit from the action, I should take my fair share of creating the benefit." (Allan Gibbard's Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment offers an effort to bring together the evolutionary history of the species with a philosopher's analysis of moral reasoning.) 
[...]
If fairness or conditional altruism are real components of human agency (for all or many human beings), then we can identify a few factors that are likely to increase the likelihood of cooperation and collective action. Measures that increase the actor's assurance of the behavior of others will have the effect of eliciting higher levels of collective action. And it is possible to think of quite a few social circumstances that have this effect. A shared history of success in collective action is clearly relevant to current actors' level of assurance about future cooperation. 
[...] 
[...]
[...] 
[...] 
So no single answer to the question of collective action seems to work: "people are rational egoists," "people are altruists," or "people are conditional altruists." Rather, a given opportunity for collective action seems to display a mix of all these styles of reasoning. These variations could be the result of several independent factors: differences in the formation of individuals' moral psychology (emphasizing individualism or community from infancy); differences in current institutional settings (arrangements that make future interactions seem more likely to each participant); even potentially differences in personality or the genetic basis of decision-making across individuals.
[...] 
Ordinary social experience informs us that people have different levels of willingness to undertake sacrifice for a group's projects.
[...] 
Here is an interesting paper by Ernst Fehr and Klaus Schmidt titled "The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism – Experimental Evidence and New Theories." 

Via  Economist's View: "Conditional Altruists"

2 de novembro de 2009

O que os outros vão fazendo, e mais um exemplo de um pequeno empurrão ("nudge")

"This fall, 50,000 Massachusetts power customers are getting their first energy report cards in the mail. Just as in school, they’re being judged against their peers, with the model citizens getting smiley faces and the laggards getting advice for cleaning up their acts. Until now, these homeowners could only judge their own energy use by their month-to-month bills. The new Home Energy Reports (HERs) compare their energy use to that of neighbors with similar demographics and similar size homes. Officials hope the peer pressure encourages users to take a few simple steps to stop wasting electricity — and money.[...]"  

"[...] In 2007, Cialdini and colleagues conducted an experiment that involved placing one of four door hangers on the doors of participants once a week for a month. The door hangers informed residents that (1) they could save money by conserving energy, or (2) they could save the earth’s resources by conserving energy, or (3) they could be socially responsible citizens by conserving energy, or (4) the majority of their neighbors tried regularly to conserve energy. Although residents reported that they would be least influenced by their neighbors’ energy usage, this was the only type of door hanger information that led to significant efforts to conserve energy.[...]"

Continuar a ler em Keeping Up With The Joneses to Save Energy | SolveClimate.com. Sobre o "nudge", o pequeno empurrão, ver também aqui e aqui.

10 de outubro de 2009

"Nudge"

Já leram "Nudge - como melhorar as decisões sobre a saúde, dinheiro e felicidade", de Richard H. Thaler e Cass R. Sunstein, da Academia de Livro? Já o tinha referido aqui, e reitero a recomendação de leitura. O vídeo acima demonstra uma aplicação da idéia.


Tirado de The Monkey Cage: How do you get people to walk up the stairs instead of taking the escalator?

2 de outubro de 2009

O Paradoxo Europeu

As percepções europeias de como a sociedade e as diversas políticas devem ser, não coincidem quanto ao que seria de esperar do comportamento eleitoral da esquerda europeia, nomeadamente, da sua social-democracia. O estudo referenciado pelo Center for American Progress apelida a situação como o Paradoxo Europeu. Ele compara com o que se passa nos EUA onde o contrário estar-se-ia a passar: - não estaríamos perante um outro paradoxo, o Paradoxo Norte-Americano, embora de sinal contrário, pergunto eu? E tudo isso sucede no quadro de alterações que, de modo objectivo, favorecem a deriva progressista da sociedade.
No entanto, em Portugal, por exemplo, essas alterações - precisadas na transcrição abaixo - estão a favorecer o Bloco de Esquerda, e isso sucede, não só pela erosão decorrente do desempenho no poder - sequelas das guerras na educação, por exemplo - como também, minha antiga tese, da falência na actuação política do PS nos campos da actuação partidária e do trabalho político com os cidadãos. Será que em Portugal, devido a ter surgido a oferta de uma alternativa sugestiva (logo que não se esgravate demasiado a superfíce e se depare com o interior ideológico subjacente - veja-se o episódio das nacionalizações) o potencial eleitoral à esquerda foi mobilizado, o que não sucederia noutros países europeus, onde as deficiências sociais-democratas e socialistas se traduziriam em abstenção? É bom lembrar que a esquerda em Portugal, considerada toda ela, não viu o seu peso eleitoral diminuir. Mas, efectivamente, não sei.

"Looking across Europe and the United States, progressives have two strengths going for them. The first is that modernizing demographic forces are shifting the political terrain in their favor. Consider these trends:


The rise of a progressive younger generation
The increase in immigrant/minority populations
The continuing rise in educational levels
The growth of the professional class
The increasing social weight of single and alternative households and growing religious diversity and secularism.


All these factors favor the broad center-left of the political spectrum in America (the Democratic Party) and in Europe (the social democrats, the greens, the far left and liberal centrists). Put simply, progressives are the natural beneficiaries of modernity and that, combined with their still substantial base among the working class, puts them in a potentially dominating political position.


Progressives’ second big advantage is the intellectual and policy bankruptcy of conservatism. Their approach to the problems afflicting today’s complex global capitalism still relies heavily on laissez-faire and is completely devoid of creative ideas for taming the immense power of this economic system for the common good. The assumption that capitalism left to its own devices is both self-regulating and productive of the best economic outcomes would be laughable at this point if the actual outcomes had not been so tragic."

15 de agosto de 2009

....

"... é assim que o mundo acaba - não com uma explosão, mas com uma lamúria".
- T.S. Eliot - não sei o contexto, a propósito do qual ele disse isso. Tirei-a de Hobsbawm, da A Era dos Extremos.

24 de julho de 2009

Elites e democracia

Apontamento muito interessante sobre o poder das elites, nas democracias, particularmente, na norte-americana: ler em Power elites after fifty years - Understanding Society:
"When C. Wright Mills wrote The Power Elite in 1956, we lived in a simpler time. And yet, with a few important exceptions, the concentration of power that he described continues to seem familiar by today's standards. The central idea is that the United States democracy -- in spite of the reality of political parties, separation of powers, contested elections, and elected representation -- actually embodied a hidden system of power and influence that negated many of these democratic ideals."

13 de junho de 2009

Aquilo que podemos fazer interessa sempre

"Nobody made a greater mistake than he who did nothing because he could do only a little." - Edmund Burke
- citado em RealClimate
PS: Contaram-me esta, lá vão alguns anos: morava na Candelária (S.Miguel, Açores) uma alemã, que separava o lixo, conforme o seu tipo, colocando-o à porta de sua casa para ser recolhido. Na altura, nem se falava do assunto. Questionada sobre a utilidade do que fazia, ela retorquiu que esse problema (inexistência de recolha de lixo seleccionada) não lhe dizia respeito, que por causa dele não iria deixar de fazer o que era correcto.

25 de março de 2009

Enquanto isso, na Europa ...




PS: Aproveito para referenciar um artigo interessante de Pedro Magalhães sobre as temáticas das próximas eleições europeias: Outras Margens: A Europa possível. A comentar, eventualmente, um dia destes.

PS (2009.03.26): E este Timothy Garton Ash: The G20 summit in London will be missing one great power. Europe Comment is free The Guardian